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The Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood
and the Road To wards the Um mah
DAN STOENESCU
In the past three dec ades, ever since po liti cal Is lam be came a pow er ful force 
in the Mid dle East, many schol ars won der if the ideal of unity of Ar abs and Mus-
lims is still pos si ble in the cur rent in ter na tional po liti cal con text. The con cept of 
Um mah (Is lamic com mu nity of be liev ers) as a base of au thor ity al ways ex isted in 
the Mid dle East even since the rise of Is lam. In or der to bet ter un der stand why this 
con cept be came so im por tant nowa days af ter it was dor mant for cen tu ries, it is 
nec es sary to look into the rise of the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt and its strife 
for the Um mah.
The ob jec tive of this es say is to criti cally ana lyze the con tem po rary de vel op-
ments of the Um mah, a con cept which be gan to re ceive more at ten tion due to the 
glob al iza tion of po liti cal Is lam. Al though this con cept is as old as Is lam it came on 
the Mid dle East ern po liti cal stage propa gated by dif fer ent Is lamic po liti cal or gani-
za tions. Out of these or gani za tions the most promi nent is the Egyp tian Mus lim 
Broth er hood. Through the years and in flu enced by the po liti cal changes in the re-
gion, the Mus lim Broth er hood de vel oped and gained mil lions of ad epts not only 
in Egypt but in the whole Mus lim World. Af ter the great Arab de feat of 1967 the 
Arab pub lic be gan to turn to Is lam in or der to find so lu tions for the day-to-day 
prob lems they were fac ing. Since the Um mah is one of Is lam’s ul ti mate goals, the 
Mus lim Broth er hood started to strive for this con cept through its po liti cal ac tiv ity 
over the past dec ades and through its in volve ment on the in ter na tional stage.
The es say is di vided in three parts. The first part will ana lyze the con cept of 
Um mah and its im pli ca tions with re gard to Arab and Is lamic unity. The sec ond 
part will search for the rea sons of the emer gence of the Mus lim Broth er hood in 
Egypt and around the Mus lim and Arab World. What are the ideo logi cal and po-
liti cal fac tors that de ter mined the rise of the Mus lim Broth er hood and the strife for 
the Um mah? The third part will look into the role that the Mus lim Broth er hood 
plays on the in ter na tional stage con cen trat ing on its for eign pol icy stances with 
re gard to the all-in clu sive Um mah.
The Con cept of Um mah
Ac cord ing to the Mus lim Broth ers, the Um mah is the ba sis of au thor ity. It is 
the Um mah that ”ap points the one whom it trusts and is sure of his faith ful ness, 
loy alty, knowl edge, ex peri ence, etc. Power can not be taken by force or with the 
sword, but it is gained through proper free choice”1. Fur ther more, the Mus lim 
1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI,”Politics in Islam”, The Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/POLITICS_IN_ISLA1.doc, p. 10. 
Accessed on 10/02/2007. 
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Ummah is con sid ered to be un der the di rect guid ance of Al lah alone and has the 
ob li ga tion to im ple ment the Quran and the Sun nah. Also, the Breth ren be lieve that 
man has to rule the Um mah only in the way re vealed by Al lah in the form of sharia. 
This way the rul ers have to rule ac cord ing with the laws of Al lah and they should 
be al ways pre pared to teach the Um mah the prin ci ples of Is lam1. Only in mod ern 
times the con cept of Um mah be gan to re ceive more at ten tion, es pe cially from the 
Islamist po liti cal move ments around the Mus lim World. Also glob al iza tion was a 
rea son that brought the Um mah in the world’s at ten tion2.
Ac cord ing to Abu Su lay man, the Um mah has many re sources, op por tu ni ties, 
and val ues and the prob lems of the Um mah are ob vi ously con nected to mys ti fied 
think ing, wrong so cial vi sion, in ap pro pri ate edu ca tion, and the de cline of its in sti tu-
tions them selves in gen eral. More over he con sid ers that Islami za tion of knowl edge 
is the most sig nifi cant is sue on the Um mah’s agenda in the next dec ades in or der to 
sus tain ac tive po liti cal ac tion and mo bi li za tion all over the Mus lim world3.
One of the main ob jec tives of the Mus lim Broth er hood is the es tab lish ment of 
a na tion based on Is lam. This goal was also ad vo cated by the Broth er hood’s ideo-
logue and leader Say yid Qutb. Ahmad S. Mous salli iden ti fies Qutb’s goal as an Is-
lamic sys tem ”where Is lamic law is exe cuted, where the idea of Is lam rules, and 
where its prin ci ples and regu la tions de fine the kind of gov ern ment and the form 
of so ci ety”4.
Ac cord ing to Salih, a pre req ui site to the use of Quran as a po liti cal model is 
the ex is tence of the Um mah. More over, ”the dif fi culty of cre at ing a po liti cal sys tem 
based on the Quran in the ab sence of a ho moge nous Mus lim na tion leads to a con-
tra dic tion be tween the Um mah as a re li gious com mu nity and the state as a sys tem 
of gov ern ment that ca ters for Mus lims and non-Mus lims alike”5.
Is lam has the con cept of uni vers al ism that stems from the call for the crea tion 
of a strong co he sive Um mah. Tibi states that ”if this call is re stricted to the real Um-
mah, to ex ist ing Mus lims, then we may talk with some re stric tions of an Is lamic-na-
tion al ist Um mah”6. In this con text po liti cal Is lam is a real threat not only to the 
na tion states them selves but also runs against the Pan-Arab pro ject7.
The idea of forg ing a dis tinc tive Is lamic World sepa rate from the West is a con-
se quence of the frag men ta tion of the in ter na tional sys tem and of the Is lamic doc-
trine it self. In or der to bet ter un der stand this trend one has to com pre hend the 
main pre cepts of the Quran. In the Is lamic holy book, Um mah means na tion and 
was started to be used as a term by both Islamists and Arab na tion al ists. The term 
1 Ibidem, p. 11.
2 Bassam TIBI, Arab Nationalism – Between Islam and Nation-State, St. Martin’s Press, New 
York, 1997, pp. 223-224.
3 Abdul Hamid A. ABU SULAYMAN, ”Crisis in the Muslim Mind”, The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought – Islamic Methodology No. 1, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official 
English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/Crisis%20in%20the%20Muslim%20Mind-AbuSulaym
an.doc, p. 80. Accessed on 10/02/2007.
4 Ahmad S. MOUSSALLI, ”Sayyid Qutb: The Ideologist of Islamic Fundamentalism”, al-Ab-
hath, no. 38, 1990, p. 60. 
5 M.A. Mohamed SALIH, ”The Bible, The Qur’an and the Conflict in South Sudan”, in Niels 
KASTFELT (ed.), Scriptural Politics – The Bible and the Koran as Political Models in the Middle East 
and Africa, C. Hurst & Company Ltd., London, 2003, p. 117. 
6 Bassam TIBI, Arab Nationalism...cit., p. 222. 
7 Ibidem.
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 679
Um mah, has a dif fer ent his tori cal and re li gious back ground than the tra di tional 
Euro pean term of a na tion. Early Is lam achieved the first Um mah that was sup-
posed to be uni ver sal not na tional or lo cal. His tori cally there never ex isted a har-
mo ni ous Um mah1.
Al-Banna has also a strongly de fined po si tion re gard ing Is lamic unity. Al-
though he rec og nizes the fact that Is lam is fore most a re lig ion, Al-Banna sees it 
also as pa tri ot ism and na tion al ity. The be lieve in Um mah, the com mu nity of be liev-
ers, still ex ists and thus he does not see dis tinc tions of na tion al ity or race be tween 
Mus lims, nor geo graphi cal bor ders for Is lam. This re lig ion in his view forms by it-
self a sin gle na tion-the Is lamic home land2.
Fur ther more, the foun der of the Mus lim Broth er hood makes a con nec tion and 
even a clas si fi ca tion in terms of na tional, Arab and Is lamic unity. Al-Banna rec og-
nizes that in Egypt the Mus lim Broth ers have to be real Egyp tian na tion al ists first 
in or der to seek a true re vival. This po si tion is truly un der stand able when it is seen 
in the con text when Al-Bana wrote it, shortly af ter the end of the Sec ond World War 
when Egypt was still un der Brit ish co lo nial rule. The sec ond link ad vo cated by 
Al-Banna is the sup port for Arab unity, also an im por tant pil lar in the move ment of 
re vival. Fi nally, Al-Banna con sid ers that the per fect en clo sure for the lar ger Is lamic 
home land is the es tab lish ment of the Is lamic League (al-jami’ah al-isla my yah) in the 
con text of world unity. World unity is con sid ered as the true goal of Is lam3.
Nowa days, the Mus lim Broth er hood changed in many ways from what Has-
san al-Banna en vi sioned it to be. For ex am ple the po si tion on party status dif fers 
since al-Banna be lieved that the dawa could not be re stricted to a party as so ci ated 
with pa trons of the rul ing au thori ties. Ac cord ing to him the dawa was ment to ad-
dress the com mon in ter est of the en tire Um mah, and not just an or gan ized part of 
it. Al though, nowa days the Broth er hood still be lieves in ad dress ing the Um mah, it 
ad mits that or gani za tion must be gin at the lo cal level, start ing with the com mu-
nity and the state. The Mus lim Broth er hood now rec og nizes that if the state within 
whose po liti cal sys tem they func tion has regu la tions al low ing the po liti cal in-
volve ment only for or gan ized par ties, in this case they must form a party4.
Al most a hun dred years ago, Abd al Rah man al Ka wakibi in his book Umm al 
Quran, ex plained in the un am bi gu ous terms how a con tem po rary Is lamic re sur-
gence might be de vel oped. His ef forts amounted only to a few lo cal ized achieve-
ments that did not ac tu ally change much in the ac tual im por tance to the Um mah 
over all5. Nowa days, the Um mah needs more ef forts at the in ter na tional level so it 
can reach a truly Is lamic ref or ma tion. Abu Su lay man ar gues that the schol ars of 
the Um mah must
”fo cus their de ter mi na tion and at ten tion first of all on the re form of Mus lim 
thought and the clari fi ca tion of Its vi sion for the Um mah and Its lead er ship. 
1 Ibidem, p. 223.
2 Hassan AL-BANNA, ”On the Doctrine of the Muslim Brothers”, in Hisham SHARABI 
(ed.), Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1966, p. 110. 
3 Ibidem, p. 110. 
4 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the 
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27, no. 3, August 
1995, p. 328.
5 Abdul Hamid A. ABU SULAYMAN, ”Crisis in the Muslim Mind”, cit., p. 81.
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There af ter, should it be the will of Al lah, the Um mah will take over with the 
work of build ing for the fu ture and pro gress ing to ward new ho ri zons”1.
The con cept of the Um mah is an es sen tial con cept in the Mus lim mind. This 
con cept repre sents the unity of Mus lims all over the world in their Is lamic faith. 
Striv ing for the Um mah has been the aim of every move ment rooted in po liti cal Is-
lam as a way of pre serv ing the na tional iden tity of the Arab peo ple and to unite 
them in a com mu nity of faith.
His tori cal Evo lu tion and Ide ol ogy of the Breth ren
Islamists are di vided in many groups, the more fun da men tal ist groups call 
for revo lu tion ary change to be im posed on the peo ple and on the po liti cal sys tem. 
The Mus lim Broth er hood of Egypt is not part of these fun da men tal ist or gani za-
tions and ad vo cates for a grad ual change that should emerge from within the po-
liti cal sys tem with the help of the Mus lim vot ers2.
The Mus lim Broth er hood is the most promi nent Islamist po liti cal move ment in 
the Arab World. Some other ex am ples of Islamist move ments in the Arab world in-
clude the Jus tice and De vel op ment Party and the Jus tice and Be nevo lence So ci ety in 
Mo rocco; the Ren ais sance Move ment in Tu ni sia; the Is lamic Sal va tion Front, Hamas 
(The Move ment for Peace ful So ci ety), the Na tional Re form Move ment and al-Na-
hda in Al ge ria; the Mus lim Broth er hood in Jor dan; The Re form Party in Yemen.
Mis tak enly, many times, the gen eral pub lic con sid ers the Mus lim Broth er hood 
as a mili tant fun da men tal ist Is lamic group. Ac cord ing to Ibra him, Is lamic mili tancy 
can be de fined as ”ac tual vio lent group be hav ior com mit ted col lec tively against the 
state or other ac tors in the name of Is lam”3. Nowa days only two groups of sub stan-
tial size met this defi ni tion: the Is lamic Lib era tion Or gani za tion (Munaz zamat al-Tah-
rir al-Islami), known in the Arab mass me dia as Ga ma'at al-Fan niya al-Askariya 
(Tech ni cal Mili tary Acad emy group) and Ga ma'at al-Mus limin (the Mus lim group) 
known in the Arab pub lic as Re pen tance and Holy Flight (al-Tak tir wa -l- Hi jra)4.
Com pared to these groups the Mus lim Broth er hood is a mod er ate po liti cal 
move ment rooted in Is lam and thus fight ing to re unite the Um mah. Ac cord ing to 
Sha hin mod er ate Islamist move ments such as the Broth er hood adopted cer tain 
guide lines in the po liti cal proc ess such as
”the rec og ni tion of the ex ist ing po liti cal re gimes and the in sti tu tions of the 
state; re spect for the rules and regu la tions that gov ern the po liti cal proc ess; 
re jec tion of vio lence; will ing ness to work in pub lic and gain some form of 
of fi cial rec og ni tion; and will ing ness to make al li ances and coa li tions with 
other po liti cal par ties that do not share their ori en ta tions”5.
1 Ibidem.
2 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 321. 
3 Saad El-Din IBRAHIM,”Egypt Islam and Democracy- Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic 
Groups Methodological, Notes and preliminary finding 1980”, The Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/Egypt_Islam_and_Democracy.
doc, p. 5. Accessed on 15/02/2007.
4 Ibidem, p. 5 
5 Emad El-Din SHAHIN, ”Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?”, Working paper, The 
American University in Cairo, February 2005, p. 5.
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Of ten re ferred to as the Broth er hood or un der their name in Ara bic al-Ikhwan 
al-Mus limun, or the Ikhwan, this or gani za tion is a group viewed by many schol ars 
as the foun der of salafi Is lam. The move ment calls for a re turn to the fun da men tal 
ba sics of Is lam as prac ticed by the origi nal foun ders, the salaf. The Mus lim Broth er-
hood origi nated in Egypt, and in its glory days, from the 1930s to the 1950s, was 
an ex tra-par lia men tary group which ap pealed oc ca sion ally to vio lence and as sas-
si na tion to reach its goals1.
Con tem po rary Mus lim Broth er hood re nounced to the vio lence ad vo cated 
in the first half of the 20th cen tury. Ac tu ally the broth er hood strongly re jects vio-
lence and ter ror ism against the state and in no cent ci vil ians as means to achieve 
their aims. In his in ter pre ta tion on the teach ings of Hasan al-Banna, al-Tilmisani 
en dorses al-Banna’s un der stand ing of ji had. Al though he vali dates the fact that 
ji had is a key ob li ga tion for each Mus lim, al-Tilmisani stresses that there is a holy 
pro hi bi tion against ag gres sion (tahrim al-’id wan) and of fen sive at tacks. As an al-
ter na tive, he be lieves that ji had stipu lates ”jus tice to ward ene mies and the guid-
ance of Mus lims to show mercy in this re spect”2. Over the time the Breth ren 
changed their tac tics and ap proach in or der to bet ter in te grate into the secu lar 
Egyp tian po liti cal sys tem but in the same time they main tained their main 
origi nal goals. 
The rise of the re li gious move ment in Egypt dates back to af ter math of the 
Arab de feat of 1967. Later on, Presi dent An war Sa dat had a rec on cilia tory pol icy 
to wards Islamist groups from 1970 to 1973 in or der to coun ter bal ance the Nas ser-
ist-left ist op po si tion. Con trary to his suc ces sor, Presi dent An war Sa dat was not 
op posed to the Is lamic Um mah3. This po liti cal en vi ron ment was a fa vor able 
ground for the de vel op ment and growth of the Mus lim Broth er hood and of other 
smaller Is lamic groups that ac tu ally rep re sent the small hard core of a ”broad but 
amor phous mass of re ligi os ity in the so ci ety a whole”4. Ac cord ing to Choud hury, 
na tional es sence, lo cal tra di tion, and the re li gious com mit ment of the popu la tion 
in deed sur vived the ide olo gies of the last part of the twen ti eth cen tury, re turn ing 
the peo ple to Is lam5. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s the main goal of most 
fun da men tal ist Is lamic mili tant groups in Egypt was to cap ture the state and 
Islam ize it from the top down. The Mus lim Broth er hood would like to do the op-
po site start ing from the bot tom up wards6. This is the main dif fer ence be tween the 
Broth er hood and all the other Is lamic groups in Egypt and else where.
The mid 1980s was the time when for the first time the Mus lim Broth er hood 
be came heav ily in volved in con tem po rary Egyp tian poli tics. They formed a coa li-
tion with their his toric ri val Al-Wafd Party in the 1984. The cru cial year 1987 rep re-
sented a boost for the Broth er hood. Their slo gan in the leg is la tive elec tions of 1987 
was ”Is lam is the key so lu tion” and was a nov elty on the Egyp tian po liti cal scene 
1 Joshua TEITELBAUM, ”The Muslim Brotherhood and the ’Struggle for Syria’, 1947-1958 
Between Accommodation and Ideology”, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 2004, p. 134.
2 Umar AL-TILMISANI, ”Do the Missionaries for God Have a Program?”, Liwa al-Islam (The 
Banner of Islam), June 1987, p. 8.
3 G.W. CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, Scorpion Publishing Ltd., 
London, 1993, p. 111.
4 Saad El-Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 3.
5 G.W. CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, cit., pp. 111-112.
6 Fawaz A. GERGES, The Far Enemy – Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005, p. 49. 
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domi nated by secu lar dis courses1. Fur ther more, in 1987, they formed the ”Is lamic 
Coa li tion” with both Al-’Amal and Al-Ah rar par ties while in the 1995 elec tions, 
which were or gan ized on an in di vid ual sys tem, the Mus lim Broth er hood gained 
only one seat2.
In 2000 the Mus lim Broth er hood gained sev en teen par lia men tary seats. Af ter 
2000, hav ing this in creased num ber of mem bers of Par lia ment the Mus lim Broth er-
hood depu ties were able to be heav ily in volved in leg is la tion and ju di cial re view3. 
Later on, the Breth ren joined the leg is la tive elec tions 2005 as in de pend ent can di-
dates. With time the Mus lim Broth er hood pres ence in the Egyp tian Par lia ment 
stead ily in creased. Just look ing at the time line of the in volve ment in the Egyp tian 
elec tions we can see this change. In the elec tions of 1984, Egyp tians voted for sev-
en mem bers of the Broth er hood while in 1987, 35 mem bers won the elec tions out 
of 60 mem bers of Par lia ment from the Is lamic Coa li tion. In the 2000 elec tions, the 
Mus lim Broth er hood gained only 17 seats then their gains in creased to a sur pris-
ing 88 seats in the 2005 elec tions4.
Af ter the fall of Com mu nism and other ide olo gies that failed in Egypt be fore 
the 1990s, the Mus lim Broth er hood came with a new kind of dis course. In the 2005 
leg is la tive elec tions of their ex peri ence taught them to be less ideo logi cal ex cept 
con cern ing their gen eral slo gan ”Is lam is the key so lu tion” and more ef fi cient and 
prag matic of fer ing so cial ser vices for citi zens as al ter na tives to the gov ern ment’s 
in ca pac ity to ad dress the im mense so cial prob lems of the coun try5.
Through out the dec ade 1984-1994, the Mus lim Broth er hood mem bers man-
aged to in fil trate into nu mer ous so cial and gov ern men tal in sti tu tions. This fact 
ob vi ously wor ried the Egyp tian re gime and made it pow er less when fac ing the 
height en ing in crease of the Breth ren’s in flu ence spread in the so ci ety. Dur ing this 
dec ade the Mus lim Broth er hood was able to have a grasp on many so cie tal in sti tu-
tions such as the syn di cates for ex am ple6.
The last part of the 1980s all the way through the 1990s, was a pe riod char ac-
ter ized by popu lar dis ap point ment with gov ern ment poli cies and vo cal calls for 
other kinds of po liti cal rep re sen ta tion of the large Mus lim masses. This gen eral 
dis ap point ment en cour aged Is lamic fun da men tal ism and made the fu ture of sta-
bil ity and peace in the Mid dle East to look quite bleak. For this rea son the gen-
eral trend to wards fun da men tal ism needed to be coun ter bal anced by more 
mod er ate Is lamic ele ments that do not ad vo cate vio lence but at the same time 
would like to fol low the Is lamic path in chang ing the Egyp tian so ci ety based on 
Is lamic moral, so cial, and eco nomic norms. Through out the past 20 years, the 
1 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, Al-Ahram Centre for Political 
and Strategic Studies – Cairo, Egypt, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/brotherfuture.doc, p. 24. Accessed on 15/02/2007.
2 Ibidem, p. 24. 
3 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”Why We Stand For Elections”, The Muslim Brotherhood 
(Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/ikhwanprogram.doc, p. 43. 
Accessed on 04/02/2007.
4 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., pp. 19-20. 
5 Ibidem, p. 24. 
6 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime: Equations of 
Struggle and the Quest for a Path”, Al-Manar Al-Jadid Magazine, issue 31-32, summer-spring 2005, The 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/Muslim 
%20Brothers%20and%20the%20Egyptian%20Regime-AmrSadawy.doc, p. 1. Accessed on 11/02/2007.
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Mus lim Broth er hood be came a cen trist mod er ate group, rep re sent ing con ven-
tional po liti cal Is lam1.
At the be gin ning of the 1990s, the su prem acy of the old guard in the lead er-
ship of the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood caused some younger mem bers to 
leave the move ment and es tab lish al-Wa sat Party (Cen ter Party) in 1995. Among 
the sec ond-gen era tion re form ists that stayed was Abd al-Mun’im Abu al-Fu-
tuh, a dy namic and elo quent spokes men mem ber of the Broth er hood’s su preme 
de ci sion-mak ing body, the Guid ance Bu reau (Mak tab al-Ir shad). He was one of 
the first Breth ren to de clare that Is lamic dis course is not holy; rather, it is found-
ed on hu man judg ment (ijti had) and can be amended and up dated to the mod ern 
era2. The Mus lim Broth ers gained more suc cess in the 1990s be cause they were 
able to build a wide-rang ing net work of so cial re la tion ships and to at tain a great 
abil ity to mo bi lize and gather. The so cial net work played the role of a buffer be-
tween the gov ern ment and his tar get of tak ing away the his tori cal repu ta tion 
from the Mus lim Broth ers in or der to de stroy the so cial di men sion of the move-
ment. The abil ity to mo bi lize the masses ex ceeds the abil ity of any other group 
or po liti cal party in Egypt. Many times this abil ity ex ceeds the ca pa bil ity of the 
gov ern ment it self3.
Ac cord ing to Mu ham mad Ma hdi Akef, chair man of the Mus lim Broth er hood, 
since the year 2000, elec tions dem on strated that an Is lamic pro ject of set ting up a 
re gime in Egypt is fea si ble. Ac cord ing to him:
”The fi nal goal of the Mus lim Broth er hood to get in the Par lia ment or 
other elected coun cils, syn di cates and all civil so ci ety es tab lish ments, is set up 
the Mus lim so ci ety which leads to set ting up the Is lamic state in which good 
for all hu man be ings, whether Mus lims or non-Mus lims, is achieved”4.
A no ta ble evo lu tion for the Mus lim Broth er hood was the Re form Ini tia tive in 
March 2004, an ini tia tive pro pos ing re forms in 13 ar eas. This ini tia tive is ex tremely 
im por tant for re form ing the Egyp tian so ci ety and the Mus lim Broth er hood it self 
but also it could af fect its af fili ated or gani za tions through out the Is lamic world. 
The Ini tia tive un am bi gu ously con firms the Broth er hood’s com mit ment to a re pub-
li can, par lia men tary, con sti tu tional, and de moc ratic sys tem in Egypt fol low ing the 
prin ci ples of Is lam. Fur ther more the ini tia tive
”calls for other po liti cal par ties to ad here to a na tional char ter that calls, 
among other things, for rec og niz ing the peo ple as the source of all au thor ity, 
re spect ing the prin ci ple of the trans fer of power through clean and free elec-
tions, con firm ing the free dom of be lief and ex pres sion, guar an tee ing the free-
dom of the for ma tion of po liti cal par ties, put ting a limit to the term of the 
presi dent, and en hanc ing the in de pend ence of the ju di ci ary”5.
1 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 322.
2 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, 
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, Hudson Institute, vol. 3, January 2006. Article available on 
the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/
Ideology_of_Egyptian_Muslim_Brotherhood.pdf, p. 2. Accessed on 04/02/2007.
3 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime...cit.”, pp. 8-9.
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”Why We Stand For Elections”, cit., p. 43.
5 Emad El-Din SHAHIN, ”Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?”, Working paper, The 
American University in Cairo, February 2005, p. 6.
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In re cent years be sides the Mus lim Broth er hood, sev eral other move ments 
ap peared in Egypt. For ex am ple, the Move ment for Change (Ke faya), the Move-
ment of the Judges, En gi neers Against Cus tody, the March 8th Group for the In de-
pend ence of the Uni ver sity are just a few move ments, most of the secu lar. These 
move ments form the new vo cal op po si tion1. In spite of the com pe ti tion for votes 
on the Egyp tian po liti cal scene, the Mus lim Broth er hood re mains the main op po si-
tion force in Egypt. The Mus lim Broth er hood’s re cent suc cesses af ter 2005 are the 
re sult of over twenty years of al li ances with other par ties and strenu ous po liti cal 
work. Also, the fa vor able in ter na tional and in ter nal en vi ron ment helped the Broth-
er hood achieve high scores in the elec tions.
In the 2005 par lia men tary elec tions the NDP (Na tional De moc ratic Party), 
that is also the gov ern ing party for a num ber of years, won most of the seats in the 
Par lia ment ob tain ing a to tal of 311 seats. Tak ing into con sid era tion that the Par lia-
ment is com posed of 444 elected depu ties and ten ap pointed by the presi dent, this 
vic tory al lowed the NDP to bene fit from a com fort able ma jor ity in all ma jor po liti-
cal mat ters when it came to vot ing2. Al though the NDP was the ex pected win ner 
of the No vem ber-De cem ber 2005 elec tions, the great sur prise was rep re sented by 
the ex cel lent per form ance of the Mus lim Broth er hood. The Breth ren won a to tal of 
88 par lia men tary seats, by far the best re sults by an Egyp tian op po si tion party in 
over 50 years. And even more re mark able was the high rate of suc cess since 61% 
of the 144 can di dates it nomi nated won the par lia men tary elec tions. This repre-
sents an ex traor di nary six-fold in crease in com pari son with their 2000 gains when 
they won only sev en teen seats. In the 2005 elec tions other secu lar op po si tion par-
ties per formed quite poorly3.
The re cent suc cess of po liti cal Is lam in flu enced not only the strat egy of the 
Mus lim Broth er hood but also that of the rul ing NDP. Some times the cause of radi-
cal Is lam is ad vo cated by the rul ing re gimes them selves when they re al ize that 
this could be a vi able venue that could re place the na tion al ist and state ide olo-
gies4. Re ly ing on re li gious le giti macy is the easy way out for cor rupt re gimes that 
loose popu lar sup port in the Arab World.
In or der to use the newly found Is lamic fer vour in Egypt in his fa vour presi-
dent Muba rak is ma nipu lat ing the vari ous sub-groups that make up the Is lamic 
move ment in clud ing the Mus lim Broth er hood. More over, he is tol er at ing, if not 
en cour ag ing, the par tici pa tion of these groups in the po liti cal proc ess in a lim ited 
way5. Choud hury states that the Muba rak re gime in or der to sup press the 
so-called fun da men tal ism started to use bru tal meth ods against Mus lim groups, 
al though some of these groups were truly us ing vio lence against the gov ern ment 
1 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime...cit.”, p. 11.
2 Amr HAMZAWY, Nathan J. BROWN, ”Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More 
Democratic Future?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace – Democracy and Rule of Law, 
December 2005, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO24.brown.hamzawy.FINAL1.pdf, pp. 3-4. 
Accessed on 11/02/2007
3 Ibidem, p. 4. 
4 Emmanuel SIVAN, ”Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Talking Over Governments”, in Barry 
RUBIN (ed.), Revolutionary and Reformers: Contemporaries Islamist Movements in the Middle East, 
State University of New York Press, New York, 2003, p. 5.
5 Denis SULLIVAN, ”Islam and Development in Egypt: Civil Society and the State”, in 
Hussin MUTALIB, Taj ul-Islam HISHMI, Islam, Muslims and the Modern State – Case-Studies of 
Muslims in Thirteen Countries, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 212. 
Romanian Political Science Review • vol. VIII • no. 3 • 2008
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 685
and in no cent ci vil ians. This way the Muba rak gov ern ment vio lates ba sic hu man 
rights and dis re gards the rule of law when fight ing fun da men tal ism. Al though 
this re gime tol er ates some Is lamic or gani za tions and pro motes Is lam at some lev-
el, Muba rak is nei ther a de moc ratic leader nor an Islamist. Fur ther more, ac cord-
ing to Choud hury, the presi den tial elec tions1 in Egypt are simi lar to those of ”the 
com mu nist and au thori tar ian states – it is a one-party elec tion which is the ne ga-
tion of one of the fun da men tal in gre di ents of a free so ci ety”2.
In the af ter math of Sep tem ber 11, 2001, the Egyp tian gov ern ment has strength-
ened the con trol meas ures over Islamist or gani za tions. The re la tion ship with the 
Mus lim Broth er hood be came quite tense es pe cially af ter the 2002 run off of the leg-
is la tive elec tions when many Broth er hood ac tiv ists were ar rested in Al ex an dria, 
al leg edly for at tempt ing to hin der pub lic bal lot ing, ri ot ing and il le gal gath er ing3. 
Sa dawy ar gues that link ing what is oc cur ring to the Mus lim Broth ers in Egypt to 
the in ter na tional poli tics, in par ticu lar the West’s stand to wards the Islamist move-
ments when fac ing vio lence and ter ror ism, is an un avoid able ap proach. The in ter-
nal fac tors in Egypt in ter min gle with the ex ter nal fac tors to gen er ate a po liti cal 
situa tion where it is im pos si ble to sepa rate the in ter nal from the ex ter nal fac tors4.
The un fa vour able in ter na tional con di tions do not al low the Islamists to as-
sume power in many coun tries in the Mid dle East. The growth of the Hu man 
Rights Move ment world wide and the in creas ing in ter na tional sym pa thy for po liti-
cal pris on ers would stop many Mid dle East ern gov ern ments to sup press Is lamic 
move ments such as the Mus lim Broth er hood. In the gen eral trend for the de moc ra-
ti za tion of the Mid dle East, even the US State De part ment sees the re la tion ship 
with the Breth ren in a more prag matic light. Sec re tary of State Rice does not see 
any more the Mus lim Broth ers as in flexi ble en emy but more of a pos si ble part ner.5 
Al though it may seem sur pris ing, many schol ars con sider that the strong show ing 
of the Mus lim Broth er hood in the 2005 par lia men tary elec tions can con trib ute to 
Egypt’s de moc ra ti za tion. These re sults may con vince the Egyp tian gov ern ment to 
find ways to rec og nize the move ment’s popu lar ity and al low some room for po liti-
cal re form. This way, the United States is in ter ested to en cour age these re forms6.
Al-Cho baki ar gues that the stance of the Mus lim Broth er hood to wards de-
moc racy var ied in dif fer ent ages sig nifi cantly. In the 1930s, the Breth ren re jected 
de moc racy since they con sid ered it as a prod uct of the west ern civi li za tion. Later 
on, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Mus lim Broth er hood be came a revo lu tion ary 
move ment and thus they ac cepted de moc racy as a venue for po liti cal change. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, the Mus lim Broth ers fo cused on re spect ing de moc racy and 
hu man rights in Egypt and ef fi ciently led the Egyp tian op po si tion groups against 
gov ern ment abuses7.
1 The 2005 presidential elections were the first multi-party presidential elections in Egypt’s 
history. Hosni Mubarak, the incumbent president of Egypt won a fifth consecutive six-year term 
in office, with official results showing he won 88.6% of the votes cast.
2 G.W. CHOUDHURY, Islam and the Modern Muslim World, cit., p. 112.
3 David THALER, ”The Middle East: The Cradle of the Muslim World”, in Angel RABASA et 
al, The Muslim World after 9/11, Project Air Force Rand Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2004, p. 98.
4 Amr Abdel Karim SADAWY, ”Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian Regime...cit.”, pp. 3-4. 
5 Ibidem, p. 11.
6 Amr HAMZAWY, Nathan J. BROWN, ”Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More 
Democratic Future?”, cit., p. 9. 
7 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 3.
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Af ter dec ades of os tra ciz ing Mus lim world’s Islamists, some west ern schol ars 
re al ized that it is ac tu ally in the in ter est of Mid dle East sta bil ity that west ern for-
eign pol icy-mak ers come to terms with the more mod er ate Islamist groups will ing 
to work within the mod ern na tion-state sys tem. This new ap proach that ”ac co mo-
da tion ists” call for is the best way in or der to avoid the bru tal sei zure of power by 
the fun da men tal ists1. A very ef fec tive way of pene trat ing the dif fer ent so cial class-
es and es pe cially the poor are non-gov ern men tal or gani za tions. The suc cess of the 
Broth er hood in this civil so ci ety sec tor gave them the op por tu nity to be heard by 
the edu cated masses and thus gather the sup port of many mem bers of Egyp tian 
in tel li gent sia. The new mem bers of the Broth er hood are able to have an in tel lec-
tual secu lar ap proach as good as their re li gious one skil fully us ing the Ara bic lan-
guage in a way in which their views are eas ily un der stood by all2.
Al though many re form ist ac ceded in the high ranks of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood, the con ser va tive still have a strong grip over the or gani za tion’s ide ol ogy. In 
2004, for ex am ple, the March Re form Ini tia tive clearly states in its in tro duc tory 
sec tion that the fi nal ob jec tive of re form in Egypt is the in tro duc tion of sharia. It 
goes on to say:
”Our only hope to achieve pro gress in all the as pects of life is by re turn-
ing to our re lig ion and im ple ment ing our sharia [. . .] We have a clear mis-
sion – work ing to put in place Al lah’s law, on the ba sis of our be lief that it is 
the real, ef fec tive way out of all of our prob lems – do mes tic or ex ter nal, po liti-
cal, eco nomic, so cial or cul tural. This is to be achieved by form ing the Mus-
lim in di vid ual, the Mus lim home, the Mus lim gov ern ment, and the state 
which will lead the Is lamic states, re unite the scat tered Mus lims, re store their 
glory, re trieve for them their lost lands and sto len home lands, and carry the 
ban ner of the call to Al lah in or der to make the world happy with Is lam’s 
bless ing and in struc tions”3.
The Mus lim Broth er hood, al though an of fi cially banned po liti cal move ment, 
has sur prised ana lysts with its strong show ing in Egypt’s 2005 par lia men tary 
elec tions. Strength en ing the role of Is lamic law (sharia) is the main aim of this or-
gani za tion in Egypt and among the group’s many off shoots around the Is lamic 
world. In spite of this clear goal Broth er hood lead ers are quite vague when asked 
for spe cif ics on how they would leg is late and im ple ment Is lam if given the op por-
tu nity. Re cently, some lead ers have ac tu ally deem pha sized the im por tance of 
sharia in their elec tions mes sages al though some times they de mand rather clear 
the im ple men ta tion of Is lamic law. Ac cord ing to Heba Raouf Ez zat, a po liti cal 
sci en tist spe cial ist in the Mus lim Broth er hood from Cairo Uni ver sity: ”Their pro-
gram re mains deeply am bigu ous”4.
The cur rent po liti cal en vi ron ment in Egypt forces the Mus lim Broth er hood to 
work within the po liti cal sys tem in or der to ad vance its goals. This strat egy makes 
1 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 322.
2 Ibidem, p. 329.
3 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood”, cit., p. 5. 
4 Sharon OTTERMAN, ”Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary Elections”, Council 
on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9319/muslim_brotherhood_and_
egypts_parliamentary_elections.html. Accessed on 10/02/2007.
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the Broth er hood a credi ble part ner and brings votes from the mod er ates. Al though 
his tori cally, po liti cal ac com mo da tion is not a new tac tic for the Broth er hood, it is 
ac tu ally a new phe nome non in terms of con crete prac tice on the Egyp tian po liti cal 
scene1. More over, ever since 1941, the Mus lim Broth er hood called for par tici pa-
tion in the sys tem. ”Early in its de vel op ment the Mus lim Broth er hood ac cepted 
that it had to con test elec tions if it was to ex er cise real in flu ence. It re solved to field 
can di dates in any forth com ing na tional elec tion.”2 Nev er the less, the Breth ren 
failed be cause of cor rupt elec tions and gov ern ment pro hi bi tions against it.
The cur rent status of the Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt looks vague since it 
does not en joy a le gal po si tion. Al though it is a banned so ci ety the Breth ren were 
able to win 20% of vot ers as well as about ten folds of what other op po si tion par-
ties rep re sented in the Par lia ment (6 seats for Al-Wafd party, 2 seats for Al-Ta-
gammu’ party and one seat for Al-Ghad party)3. In or der to un der stand the 
in credi ble gains made by the Mus lim Broth er hood in the 2005 elec tions we have to 
look be yond ide ol ogy. The suc cess lies in the move ment’s con cen trated pres ence 
in many so cial spheres and its work as a grass-roots ser vice-pro vi sion or gani za-
tion. More over, the Broth er hood is an ex ten sive so cial move ment heav ily in volved 
in the fields of health care, edu ca tion, and pov erty al le via tion. Since Egyp tian 
state in sti tu tions from such so cial and eco nomic fields since the mid-1970s per-
form poorly this civil space was filled by the lo cal re li gious forces rep re sented by 
the Broth er hood. The Mus lim Broth er hood was able to use its new so cial net works 
based on re li ance among citi zens in or der to gain and use ef fec tively fi nan cial re-
sources, or gan iza tional ca paci ties, and chari ta ble work4.
Look ing at the evo lu tion of the Mus lim Broth er hood over the dec ades we can 
ob serve a cer tain flexi bil ity and prag ma tism that drove the or gani za tion in the 
fore front of the Egyp tian and Mid dle East poli tics. Al though the or gani za tion fo-
cused on na tional prob lems dur ing the elec tions its core ide ol ogy re mained the 
same and sees the Quran and con se quently the im ple men ta tion of the sharia and 
the uni fi ca tion of the Um mah as main ob jec tives on the long run.
Nowa days the Egyp tian branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood still re mains the 
most sig nifi cant Broth er hood group, al though some other off shoots have thrived 
through out the Mid dle East and even Europe. In spite of the cur rent specu la tions, 
there is ac tu ally no Islamist ”Comintern” since the Broth er hood’s In ter na tional 
Or gani za tion is in re al ity a weak coa li tion hardly able to as sem ble its own mem-
bers. Many schol ars be lieve that this in ter na tional de bil ity is a re sult of the Broth-
er hood’s suc cesses at the na tional level. Be cause of the na tional auton omy and 
adapta bil ity to lo cal con di tions, the Broth er hood’s in ter na tional links de pend in di-
vidu ally on every coun try’s na tional pri ori ties5.
The na tional branches of the Mus lim Broth er hood do not al ways have simi lar 
views re gard ing vari ous is sues such as their stance on the re la tion ship with the 
United States. Al though, for ex am ple, in Egypt and Jor dan, in or der to fight their 
1 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 328.
2 John L. ESPOSITO, James P. PISCATORI, ”Democratization and Islam”, Middle East Journal, 
no. 3, Summer 1991, p. 429.
3 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 35. 
4 Amr HAMZAWY, Nathan J. BROWN, ”Can Egypt’s Troubled Elections Produce a More 
Democratic Future?”, cit., p. 4.
5 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 86 no. 2, March/April 2007, p. 115.
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gov ern ment’s au toc racy and the Mus lim Broth ers see fa vora bly some US poli-
cies, over all they se verely criti cize the United States, es pe cially dur ing the elec-
tions. In the case of the Syr ian Broth er hood there is a re verse situa tion since this 
Broth er hood branch sup ports the Bush ad mini stra tion’s move to iso late Ba shar al 
As sad and his re gime1.
Po liti cal Is lam knows no bor ders. Only look ing of the way Mus lims in the 
West sup port dif fer ent po liti cal aims in the Mid dle East we can re al ize that the Um-
mah be came truly trans na tional. Sup pressed through out much of the Arab World, 
the Broth er hood found ref uge also across the Medi ter ra nean in Europe via stu-
dents and ex iles. Fur ther more Is lamic schol ars that act as higher le gal and moral 
au thori ties are not es tab lish in their na tive coun try. For ex am ple, Shaykh Yu suf 
al-Qaradawi of Egypt’s Mus lim Broth er hood lives in Qatar and is at the same time 
the su preme mufti of the Pal es tin ian Hamas while Shaykh Ibn Qatada, a Pal es tin-
ian-Jor da nian re sid ing in Brit ain, is a mufti for some branches of the Al ge rian 
Armed Is lamic Group (GIA). Also, an Egyp tian such as Abu Hamza is one of 
GIA’s main ideo logues and propa gan dists2.
Al though in de pend ent, the Mus lim Broth er hood off shoots col labo rate with 
each other to the ex tent of their own na tional in ter ests. At the be gin ning of the 
1990s the Mus lim Broth er hood adopted a more con ser va tive line. This fact in flu-
enced also the re la tion ship with its branches bring ing dis ad van tages to the or gani-
za tion since it con trib uted to the loss of con trol over those Mus lim Broth er hood 
branches out side Egypt. For ex am ple, the Syr ian branch of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood, adopted a more prac ti cal ap proach while the In ter na tional Or gani za tion of 
the Mus lim Broth er hood (IOMB) has been gradu ally trans formed. Nowa days, the 
pro moter of IOMB, Shaykh Yu suf al-Qaradawi es tab lished World As so cia tion of 
Mus lim Cler ics, which re places the tra di tional role of the Mus lim Broth er hood as 
the Sunni fun da men tal ist source of au thor ity (marja’iyyah)3.
Al though in the early 1980s, the Egyp tian Broth er hood’s In ter na tional Or gani-
za tion sought to co or di nate its off shoots around the Arab World they en coun tered 
fierce op po si tion eve ry where. For ex am ple the Su da nese Mus lim Broth er hood lead-
er Hasan al-Turabi pro tested, ”You can not run the world from Cairo”4. More over 
when Iraq in vaded Ku wait in 1990, the Ku waiti Mus lim Broth ers ob jected to the 
tacit con sent of the In ter na tional Or gani za tion and with drew from the or gani za tion 
and also cut ting their fund ing. Also, the Iraqi branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood 
col labo rates with the US-con trolled gov ern ment in Bagh dad against the pro tests of 
their fel low Mus lim Broth ers world wide. More over, in 2006, the coa li tion be tween 
the Syr ian Mus lim Broth er hood and Ab del Halim Khad dam, the re bel for mer Syr-
ian vice presi dent, has been ex ten sively criti cized by other Broth er hood branches. 
The 2006 Leba non war fur ther di vided the Breth ren in the Arab world. The Syr ian 
Mul sim Broth ers con demned Presi dent Ba shar al-As sad’s in ter fer ing in Leba non, 
while the other off shoots of the Mus lim Broth er hood sup ported Hez bol lah5.
1 Ibidem, p. 116.
2 Emmanuel SIVAN, ”Why Radical Muslims Aren’t Talking Over Governments”, cit., p. 5.
3 Reuven PAZ, ”Qaradhawi and the World Association of Muslim Clerics: The New 
Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood”, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, 
The Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM), Occasional Papers, vol. 2, no. 4, 
November 2004, www.eprism.org, Accessed on 04/02/2007
4 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 115.
5 Ibidem.
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Al though the dif fer ent off shoots of the Mus lim Broth er hood do not act as a 
whole, they still have the same ob jec tives in mind and they strive for the Um mah. 
More over, the Mus lim Broth er hood has nor mal re la tion ships with other Is lamic 
move ments not in volved in poli tics be cause they are still part the greater Is lamic 
so ci ety1. As the main pro moter of po liti cal Is lam in the Arab World, the Egyp tian 
Mus lim Broth er hood be came a cata lyst for other Is lamic or gani za tions and for their 
branches in the Mus lim World. Fur ther more, the Egyp tian Breth ren gained a truly 
in flu en tial role in the Is lamic so ci ety all over the world by be com ing a model for po-
liti cal achieve ments through their mod er ate stance. This mod er ate stance is es sen-
tial for the Broth er hood’s for eign pol icy mak ing and in ter na tional re la tions since it 
is giv ing a real hope to those Mus lims look ing to wards uni fy ing the Um mah.
In or der to bet ter un der stand the Mus lim Broth er hood’s strive for the Um mah 
it is nec es sary to look into its his toric ideo logi cal de vel op ment and vi sion for 
socio-po liti cal change. Al-Cho baki be lieves that ”the Mus lim Broth er hood’s speech 
con tains many con tra dict ing du ali ties such as the du al ity of re lig ion and poli tics 
on one side, and the par tial struc ture and re nounc ing au thor ity on the other”2. 
More over, ac cord ing to Al Muba rak, ”the the ory and prac tice of Is lam, over four-
teen cen tu ries and in dif fer ent coun tries and con ti nents can pro vide evi dence of 
com pel ling and even con tra dic tory in ter pre ta tions”3. These du ali ties men tioned 
above both in terms of theo logi cal ap proach and secu lar poli tics make the Mus lim 
Broth er hood a prag matic or gani za tion that never lost sight of the Um mah.
Com pared to the other ma jor po liti cal move ments in Egypt, the Mus lim Broth-
er hood has a unique theo logi cal ap proach to wards poli tics. Since the Mus lim 
Broth er hood preaches in tense spiri tual re newal, the or gani za tion does not even 
per ceive it self as a po liti cal party (hizb) but more as a so ci ety (jama’a) co or di nat ing 
a wide range of ac tivi ties in tended to im ple ment Is lam in all as pects of life4. The 
phi loso phy of the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood in Egypt has a few ma jor ob jec-
tives and strate gies. The most im por tant goal pur sued by the Broth er hood is the 
found ing of an Is lamic state gov erned by Sharia, Is lamic law. Be sides this goal that 
has been al ways in the minds of Is lamic schol ars and rul ers, other aims are more 
simi lar to the aims of West ern so cie ties. Such aims in clude the im po si tion of de-
moc ratic ide als such as lib erty, rep re sen ta tion, and re spon si bil ity; and the pur suit 
of so cio eco nomic fair ness5.
The dawah is an Ara bic term mean ing ”in vite” or ”in vi ta tion” and it is con sid-
ered to be an ob li ga tion on every Mus lim to in vite oth ers to Is lam, it is also the 
preach ing of Is lam. For the Mus lim Broth er hood ever since 1928 the dawa is a great 
con cern. In terms of the Arab world the dawa is ex cep tion ally ef fec tive in coun tries 
such as Jor dan where Jab hat Al-’Amal Al-Islami (the Is lamic front) is a very im por-
tant po liti cal force, and in Yemen where the Is lah (ref or ma tion) Party in flu ences 
the poli tics of the coun try6.
1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, The Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/A_QUIET_
DISCUSSION_ON_HEATED_ISSUES.doc, p. 10. Accessed on 10/02/2007
2 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 47.
3 Khalid AL-MUBARAK, Turabi’s ”Islamist” Venture Failure & Implications, El Dar El Thaqafia, 
Cairo, 2001, p. 43. 
4 Anthony GORMAN, Historians, State and Politics in Twentieth Century Egypt, Routledge 
Curzon, London, 2003, p. 98.
5 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 336.
6 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 16.
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In or der to un der stand ac cu rately the goals of the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er-
hood, one must first un der stand that Is lam is not just a re lig ion; it is much more 
than that. Ac tu ally, a pre cise defi ni tion of Is lam would un avoid ably in ter pret that 
Is lam is both ”re lig ion and state” (din wa dawla). Umar al-Tilmisani, the Gen eral 
Guide of the Mus lim Broth er hood un til his death in 1987 had this kind of in ter pre-
ta tion. He char ac ter ized Is lam as ”creed, wor ship, home land, citi zen ship, crea tion, 
the physi cal, cul ture, law, for give ness, and power”1.
His tori cally the Mus lim Broth er hood has been a com mu nity of Mus lims dedi-
cated to the rule on Is lamic prin ci ples and to the strife to re vive them. The Broth er-
hood has two es sen tial aims: lib er at ing “the Is lamic home land” from any for eign 
oc cu pa tion; and cre at ing in that free home land a free Is lamic state that will fol low 
the prin ci ples of Is lam, in clud ing its so cial or der. Be fore reach ing these es sen tial 
goals the Breth ren have other seven in ter me di ary goals pre scribed by found ing 
fa ther of the Mus lim Broth er hood al-Banna. These seven in ter me di ary goals are 
ar ranged hi er ar chi cally2.
At the base of the hi er ar chy is the for ma tion of the Mus lim as a per son, fol-
lowed by the for ma tion of the Mus lim fam ily, which is the base of the fu ture Mus-
lim so ci ety that will de cide later on to choose a Mus lim gov ern ment. Fur ther more, 
abid ing by Al lah’s law, the Mus lim gov ern ment will cre ate an Is lamic state. This 
Is lamic state will be the main force that will lib er ate Mus lim lands oc cu pied by 
for eign forces. This Is lamic state will be, ac cord ing to al-Banna, the state that will 
gather all other Mus lim coun tries in a un ion. The main ob jec tive of that un ion is 
not only to gov ern ac cord ing to Is lam over the Mus lim lands but also to spread Is-
lam in the en tire world. Al-Banna states that work ing to wards es tab lish ing an Is-
lamic gov ern ment is truly a re li gious duty (farid hah) for every Mus lim since only 
this way the po liti cal, eco nomic, so cial, do mes tic and ex ter nal prob lems of the 
Mus lim Na tion can be solved3.
The Mus lim Broth er hood’s pro gram rec og nizes shariah as the main path way 
for cre at ing pro gress, de vel op ment and re form in a way in which poli tics would 
be link with re li gious mor als and thus mak ing the po liti cal dis course truly no ble. 
More over, the Mus lim Broth ers rec og nize shariah as the only way for fol low ing the 
wish of Al lah and iden tify this means as ab so lutely nec es sary for the com mu nity 
since it stems from Is lam4.
Le gal Coun selor Mu ham mad Ma’mun Al-Hu daibi, the dep uty of the Mur-
shid (gen eral guide of the Mus lim Broth er hood), ar gues that the ide ol ogy of the 
Mus lim Broth er hood has two key pil lars: the in tro duc tion of sharia and the strife 
to wards uni fi ca tion of Is lamic coun tries, mainly among the Arab states. Fur ther-
more he calls for lib er at ing them from for eign in flu ence and oc cu pa tion5. His tori-
cally this goal has al ways been on the Breth ren agenda. The Mus lim Broth er hood 
ever since its es tab lish ment has been heav ily in volved in the fight for lib era tion of 
1 Umar AL-TILMISANI, ”Do the Missionaries for God Have a Program?”, Liwa al-Islam (The 
Banner of Islam), June 1987, p. 7. 
2 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood”, cit., p. 2. 
3 Ibidem, p. 2. 
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/
ikhwanprogram.doc, p. 2. Accessed on 04/02/2007.
5 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI,”Politics in Islam”, cit., p. 6.
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Egypt from Brit ish oc cu pa tion and achieved it later on with the par tici pa tion of 
other po liti cal forces1.
Al-Hu daibi ar gues that in the sharia there are un equivo cal texts that call for 
the obliga tory im ple men ta tion of Is lamic law. More over, ac cord ing to sharia, Mus-
lim rul ers should abide by the texts. Such Quranic texts are:
”O ye who be lieve! Obey Al lah, and obey the Apos tle, and those charged 
with au thor ity among you. If ye dif fer in any thing among your selves, re fer 
it to Al lah His Apos tle, if ye do be lieve in Al lah and the Last Day: that is best, 
and most suit able for fi nal de ter mi na tion”. (An-Nisa: 59)
”But no, by thy lord, they can have not (real) Faith, un til they make thee 
judge in all dis putes be tween them, and find in their souls no re sis tance against 
thy de ci sions, but ac cept them with the full est con vic tion”. (An-Nisa: 65)
”The an swer of the be liev ers, when sum moned to Al lah and His Apos tle, 
in or der that he may judge be tween them, is no Other than this: they say, ’we 
hear and we obey’: It is such as these that will at tain fe lic ity.” (An-Nur: 51)
”Then we put thee on the (right) way of Re lig ion: so fol low thou that 
(Way), and fol low not the de sires of those who know not”." (Al- Jathiya: 18)
”To thee we sent the Scrip ture in truth con firm ing the Scrip ture that 
came be fore it, and guard ing it in safety: so judge be tween them by what Al-
lah hath re vealed….” (Al-Ma’idah: 51)2.
Al though in many speeches and even docu ments the Breth ren preach oth er-
wise, of fi cially the Mus lim Broth er hood has in sisted on the fact that they do not 
seek to es tab lish a re li gious state or a re li gious gov ern ment. On the con trary they 
ad vo cate the es tab lish ment of a civil gov ern ment and a civil state in which Is lam 
is the main ba sis of au thor ity. The rea son be hind this is that: sharia in an ul ti mate 
source of au thor ity that de rives from God, while the gov ern ment de rives its au-
thor ity from the peo ple it gov erns3.
Com pared to the other ma jor po liti cal move ments in Egypt, the Mus lim Broth-
er hood has also a dis tinc tive po liti cal agenda where so cial is sues are in ter twined 
with re lig ion and poli tics. The Mus lim Broth er hood’s po liti cal dis course is not 
only a purely re li gious one but has deep so cial fea tures that ap peal to the im pov er-
ished Egyp tian masses. In its 2005 elec tions pro gram the Broth er hood
”sees that Egypt has suf fered for long time from the ab sence of de moc racy, the 
mo nop oly of wealth and au thor ity, the ris ing of cor rup tion, the abun dance of 
laws and clauses that op pose pub lic free doms and hu man rights, the in creas-
ing num ber of the po liti cal de tain ees and the vari ous types of tor ture”4.
This ap proach has ex isted since the found ing of the Broth er hood and did not 
change in terms of tac tics for win ning popu lar sup port. The foun der of the Mus-
lim Broth er hood, Has san Al-Banna en vis aged three phases for the de vel op ment 
of the Mus lim Broth er hood:
1 Ibidem, p. 6. 
2 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI,”Politics in Islam”, cit., pp. 9-10.
3 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood”, cit., p. 5.
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 26.
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”1. Win ning ad her ents through ’propa ganda, com mu ni ca tion and in for-
ma tion’. 2. ’For ma tion, se lec tion and prepa ra tion’, in which cad res would be 
cho sen, mem bers ranked ac cord ing to their status and kind of ac tiv ity in the 
move ment, and an enor mous em pha sis would be placed on pub li ca tions, 
jour nal ism, and meet ings. 3.’Exe cu tion’, in which all kinds of changes in so-
ci ety would be strug gled for”1.
Nowa days the same ap proach is used. The Mus lim Broth er hood’s pro gram 
for the par lia men tary elec tions of 2005 is ob vi ously based on Is lam in or der to re-
form ”the de moc ratic mecha nisms of the mod ern civil state”2. The main rea son ing 
be hind the Is lamic ap proach for a re newal of so ci ety is the fact that
”each man wishes for oth ers what he wishes for him self and faith in creases. 
Con se quently, man’s con science comes to life and eve ry one feels Al lah’s Pres-
ence; thus, the rates of cor rup tion in so ci ety de crease on eco nomic, po liti cal 
and so cial lev els”3.
In the Egyp tian po liti cal en vi ron ment where cor rup tion can be found at many 
lev els this re li gious ap proach gained many sym pa thiz ers among the large masses 
es pe cially among young ur ban poor and re li gious bour geoi sie. The so cial base of 
Is lamic or gani za tions around the Mus lim world is al most uni form: stu dents in 
tech ni cal fac ul ties, re cent mi grants to cit ies and mem bers of the ur ban lower-mid-
dle class4. In Egypt, the Mus lim Broth er hood thrives in the pro fes sional as so cia-
tions of doc tors, law yers, phar ma cists, and en gi neers and thus has the op por tu nity 
to at tract younger pro fes sion als and re cent uni ver sity gradu ates5.
The pro gram with which the Broth er hood gained most popu lar sup port was 
its 2005 elec tions pro gram. The 2005 Mus lim Broth er hood pro gram is di vided into 
three parts: re vival, de vel op ment and re form. The re vival part in cludes the Broth-
er hood’s stand on moral val ues, cul ture, free dom, hu man rights, rights of citi zen-
ship, de vel op ment of man, me dia, youth, women, and chil dren. The sec ond part 
analy ses the or gani za tion’s vi sion on the de vel op ment of few im por tant sec tors 
such as ag ri cul ture, edu ca tion, sci en tific re search, in dus try, con struc tional de vel-
op ment, health, and en vi ron ment6. The larg est part of the Mus lim Broth er hood’s 
2005 elec toral pro gram deals with re form at a po liti cal, eco nomic and so cial level. 
The pro gram is very com pre hen sive since it in cludes do mes tic and for eign pol icy 
is sues, things that con cern the civil so ci ety, but also re form ing the na tional se cu-
rity and the lo cal rul ing. In terms of eco nomic and so cial re form the is sues are the 
same is sues that all the other par ties in Egypt want to tackle: un em ploy ment, 
budget defi cit, in ter nal and ex ter nal debt and in fla tion, so cial se cu rity ser vices, 
1 Michael GILSENAN, Recognizing Islam – Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East, I.B. 
Tauris Publishers, London, 2000, p. 219. 
2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 1.
3 Ibidem, p. 1. 
4 Mohammed M. HAFEZ, Why Muslims Rebel – Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2003, p. 16.
5 Ibidem, p. 16.
6 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 4.
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in sur ance and re tire ment rights, health in sur ance and pro mot ing moral val ues, a 
point high on the Broth er hood’s agenda1.
As a con tem po rary po liti cal move ment on the Egyp tian po liti cal scene, the 
Mus lim Broth er hood proves to be a very prag matic or gani za tion that not only re-
jected vio lence but also em braced west ern ide als and called for the de vel op ment of 
de moc racy within a state ruled by Is lamic law. In spite of the schol arly de bate on the 
com pati bil ity be tween sharia and de moc racy, the Mus lim Broth er hood es tab lished 
in Egypt a real model for the pur suit of Is lamic ide als. This po liti cal model is a much 
more mod er ate way than the model fol lowed by other more radi cal groups2.
Be sides the theo logi cal and socio-po liti cal fea tures of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood’s po liti cal dis course, the Breth ren dis play a cer tain kind of Egyp tian na tion-
al ism that is com ple men tary with the higher goal of unit ing the Um mah and 
lib er at ing it from for eign in vad ers. In this proc ess Ar ab ism also plays a key role. 
The Mus lim Broth er hood calls for the es tab lish ment of an Is lamic state for the 
all-in clu sive Um mah, a state based on val ues such as truth and jus tice not only 
among its citi zens but also among all na tions on the same stan dards3.
Not only the Mus lim Broth er hood, but other Egyp tian Islamist or gani za tions 
see Egypt as es sen tial in the spread of Is lam and the uni fi ca tion of the Um mah. For 
ex am ple, one leader of the Is lamic Lib era tion Or gani za tion (MA) in Egypt said in 
an in ter view that
”we be lieve that the Egyp tians are ba si cally the most re li gious of all Is lamic 
peo ples. They were so be fore Is lam, from the time of the Phar aohs. They 
have con tin ued to be very re li gious. Egypt would there fore be a good base 
to start the world Mus lim re vival. All that the re li gious Egyp tians need is a 
sin cere Mus lim lead er ship. This con vic tion, we be lieve, had a de ci sive im-
pact on shap ing the strat egy of MA, as will be shown later”4.
Ac cord ing to Cot tam, the change in Egyp tian-iden tity pat terns was in flu enced 
by the growth of the po liti cally par tici pant popu la tion. In the 1920s the Egyp tians 
per ceived them selves as Egyp tians first only af ter as Mus lims and Ar abs. Later on 
dur ing Nas ser the three iden ti ties con verged. Tak ing into con sid era tion the growth 
of the po liti cal par tici pa tion and in view of the fact that re li gious masses started to 
go through a proc ess of crys tal li za tion of their iden tity, the popu la tion started to 
loose their Egyp tian and Arab iden ti ties and be came more Is lamic. This way the 
Egyp tians started a trans for ma tion at their iden tity level to wards in te gra tion with 
the lar ger Um mah. Their links to their Egyp ti aness and the Arab com mu nity com-
pli cate this proc ess5.
The Mus lim Broth ers proudly con sider them selves na tion al ists since they 
fought for the in de pend ence of Egypt and the other Arab coun tries.
”The Mus lim Broth ers love their coun try and are anx ious to pre serve its 
unity; they find noth ing wrong for any man in be ing loyal to his coun try, 
1 Ibidem, p. 5.
2 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 337.
3 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 8. 
4 Saad El Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 8.
5 Richard COTTAM, ”Nationalism in the Middle East: A Behavioural Approach”, in Said 
Amir ARJOMAND (ed.), From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, State University of New York 
Press, Albany, 1984, pp. 36-37. 
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dy ing for the sake of his peo ple, and whish ing for his fa ther land every glory 
and every honor, and every pride. All this is from the par ticu lar stand point 
of na tion al ism [min wi jhat al-qaw mi y yah al-khas sah]…”1
More over the Breth ren see them selves as an es sen tial tool in unit ing all the 
Ar abs un der the flag of Is lam in or der to achieve their higher goal, the Um mah:
”The Ar abs are the core and guardi ans of Is lam…Arab unity is an es sen-
tial pre req ui site for the res to ra tion of Is lam’s glory, the re es tab lish ment of the 
Mus lim State, and the con soli da tion of Mus lim power. This is why it is the 
duty of every Mus lim to work for the re vival and sup port of Arab unity-this 
is the po si tion of the Mus lim Broth ers in re gards to Arab unity”2.
Look ing at the Mus lim Broth er hood’s po liti cal agenda we can also dis tin-
guish cer tain fea tures that pro mote Ar ab ism. In terms of edu ca tion the Mus lim 
Broth er hood stresses some na tion al is tic and re li gious aims. For ex am ple, the 2005 
elec toral pro gram views edu ca tion as means to co in cide ”with the iden tity of the 
na tion and the con sti tu tion, and main tains the Ara bic lan guage”3. More over, the 
Arab and Is lamic val ues4 in edu ca tion are strongly en shrined in the Broth er hood’s 
pro gram. The most re spected Is lamic uni ver sity in the world, Al-Az har, has a cen-
tral role in this proc ess and the pro gram re quests fur ther sup port for the uni ver-
sity’s ba sic aims and needs5. Al though, Al-Az har Uni ver sity is seen as a model for 
edu ca tional de vel op ment the Mus lim Broth er hood rec og nizes the need for im-
prov ing the cur ric ula and the edu ca tion plans in or der to bet ter serve re li gious 
peo ple, sci en tists and edu ca tors from both Arab and Is lamic worlds6 and to pro-
vide guide lines for them.
Fur ther more, an other move that proves the Arabist aims of the Broth er hood 
is their de mands to the High Coun cil of the Uni ver si ties and to the syn di cates to 
adopt a na tional plan to Arabize the sci ences and edu ca tion7. In Egypt, and in 
many other Ara bic speak ing coun tries, many sub jects and sci ences in par ticu lar 
are taught in Eng lish or French. This is not only a leg acy of the co lo nial pe riod but 
also a way for the cur ric ula to keep up with the lat est sci en tific and tech no logi cal 
ad vances of the time. Since the el ites in the Mid dle East have been tra di tion ally 
edu cated in a for eign lan guage there was no op po si tion and ac tu ally it made 
much sense. The Mus lim Broth er hood calls for trans lat ing books and re search into 
Ara bic8, in vent ing new words in Ara bic in or der to de velop the lan guage and 
bring it in mod ern times but also for the large masses that speak only Ara bic to 
have ac cess to some fields in edu ca tion that were banned for dec ades by the for-
eign edu cated, and many times more lib eral, rul ing elite.
1 Hassan AL-BANNA, ”On the Doctrine of the Muslim Brothers”, in Hisham SHARABI 
(ed.), Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Princeton, 
New Jersey, 1966, p. 110. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 19.
4 Ibidem, p. 21.
5 Ibidem, p. 20.
6 Ibidem, p. 21.
7 Ibidem, p. 22. 
8 Ibidem.
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Ac cord ing to the Mus lim Broth er hood, Marx ism and secu lar ism bring per ver-
sion, cor rup tion, and false hood es pe cially among the young peo ple thus di vert ing 
their at ten tion from the teach ings of Is lam. Fur ther more in many Mus lim coun-
tries the west ern me dia spreads ob sceni ties such as half-na ked drunken women, 
ob scene lit era ture, songs, plays, films, and por no graphic ma te rial. These ob sceni-
ties are cor rupt ing the Mus lim peo ple and thus they rep re sent a West ern men ace 
to Is lamic so cie ties1. This west ern cul tural in va sion is also seen by the Mus lim 
Broth er hood as a con tinua tion of the cru sader spirit of the West. This cru sader 
spirit lasted from the Mid dle Ages to this day and it is di rected against the Mus lim 
Um mah. Al though many Mus lim in tel lec tu als doubted the au then tic ity of this 
West ern cru sad ing spirit, claim ing that na tional in ter ests are over rid ing and they 
are gen er ally the only rea sons for the West when at tack ing Is lamic coun tries, the 
Mus lim Broth er hood be lieves that cur rent cir cum stances have dem on strated the 
cru sad ing spirit is still the driv ing force of the West in Mid dle East poli tics2.
Mu ham mad Ma hdi ‘Akif, a more con ser va tive leader of the Broth er hood, 
states in a few ar ti cles3 pub lished in 2005 that the fun da men tal aims of the Broth er-
hood did not change. To lib er ate the Is lamic home land and to found a free Is lamic 
state are the guid ing prin ci ples that the old guard still ad here to. Fur ther more he 
be lieves that Is lam’s prin ci ples are des tined to or gan ize peo ple’s af fairs in this 
world and in the af ter life, and the sum of Is lam’s laws is con structed of in du bi ta-
ble prin ci ples that can not be over stated. He con sid ers that the dif fer ent parts of Is-
lam are in te grated and each part is sym bi oti cally linked to the other: the faith 
(‘aqi dah), the law (sharia) and the acts of de vo tion (‘ibadat). These can not be sepa-
rate ”re lig ion from poli tics, or re lig ion from the state, or the acts of de vo tion from 
[po liti cal] lead er ship”4.
Al though mod er ate Islamist move ments and par ties such as the Mus lim 
Broth er hood have not com pletely aban doned their goal of es tab lish ing an Is lamic 
state, they call for a grad ual ap proach and work ing through au thor ized chan nels 
in or der to reach their aims. Mus lim Broth er hood mem bers com peted in lo cal and 
leg is la tive elec tions, many times as in de pend ents or in al li ance with other po liti cal 
par ties, thus dem on strat ing ad her ence to de moc racy. This strat egy of mod er ate 
Islamist move ments made them aware that they have more op por tu ni ties for suc-
cess in the de moc ratic game rather than us ing to vio lent means5.
The ide ol ogy of Is lamic mili tant groups in Egypt is far more con ser va tive than 
that of the Mus lim Broth er hood. For ex am ple in their lit era ture they use axio matic 
state ments con sid er ing that man was cre ated for a rea son to rep re sent the will of 
God by lead ing a vir tu ous life and fol low ing the right path (al-sirat al-mustaqima). 
1 Yusuf AL-QARADAWI, ”Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism”, The 
Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/
Islamic%20Awakening%20.doc., p. 37. Accessed on 10/02/2007.
2 Ibidem, p. 40. 
3 Muhammad Mahdi ‘AKIF, ”We Never Did and Never Will Talk to the Americans”, June 
22, 2005; IDEM, ”The MB and the Return of the Islamic Revival”, July 10, 2005. The Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanonline.com. Accessed on 
10/02/2007.
4 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, 
cit., p. 4.
5 Emad El-Din SHAHIN, ”Political Islam: Ready for Engagement?”, Working paper, The 
American University in Cairo, February 2005, p. 5.
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Fur ther more, they be lieve that to be come a good Mus lim one must not be con tent 
with only ob serv ing the com mand ments, ta boos, and other ritu als. In their view a 
per son has to do more, the moral Mus lim can not ex ist alone; he must strug gle to 
build and pre serve a right eous com mu nity of the faith ful (the Um mah). This strug-
gling to build up the Um mah is a duty of every true Mus lim1.
Is lamic mili tant groups have many things in com mon with the Mus lim Broth-
er hood. In terms of ide ol ogy the main dif fer ence be tween them and the Breth ren 
is the means to achieve their goals. They view the pre sent as a fun da men tal part of 
their prin ci ples con sid er ing the cur rent gov ern ing sys tem in Egypt as cor rupt and 
in com pe tent. Ac cord ing to Is lamic mili tant groups the ene mies of Is lam like the 
Chris tian West, the Jew ish Zi on ism, and athe ist com mu nism hu mili ated the gov-
ern ment and force it to make un ac cept able con ces sions. For this rea son the re gime 
de vi ated from ”the straight path” and was not able to fight against the for eign as-
saults on Dar al-Is lam (the home land of Is lam) on the home front. More over, they 
con sider that the re gime did not im ple ment sharia well enough fa vor ing west-
ern-im ported le gal codes. While the po liti cal lead ers of the coun try live in moral 
de cay, pov erty, dis ease, il lit er acy and the vices (radhila) are ram pant in Egypt. Ac-
cord ing to mili tant Is lamic groups but also to the Mus lim Broth er hood the only 
way for a moral re vival of so ci ety is to im ple ment the sharia2.
Radi cal Islamist groups cre ated also a split in the Mus lim Broth er hood be-
tween re form ers and con ser va tives. The best ex am ple of the in ter nal fric tions be-
tween con ser va tive and re form ist mem bers of the Mus lim Broth er hood is the 
pol icy shift in the 2005 presi den tial elec tion. The re form ists en cour aged the Broth-
er hood to join other op po si tion groups in an ef fort to force po liti cal change while 
the con ser va tives strongly op posed this move since they were re luc tant to risk the 
long-term at tempt to Islam ize the so ci ety for po liti cal gains on the short-term. The 
con ser va tives were rep re sented by the Gen eral Guide Akif. In 2005 they over ruled 
the re form ist side rep re sented by Abu al-Fu tuh. In the 2005 elec tions the Mus lim 
Broth er hood de clared that its can di dates would now con sider them selves as rep re-
sent ing the Mus lim Broth er hood and not ”the Is lamic Trend”, as they had done 
pre vi ously since the 1990s3. This trend to wards a more con ser va tive ap proach is 
ac tu ally the gen eral trend in many Arab coun tries in the re gion. The rise of Hez bol-
lah in Leba non and Hamas in Pal es tine are only a few ex am ples of this trend. The 
move to wards a con ser va tive ap proach has helped the Mus lim Broth er hood, 
Hamas and Hez bol lah to pre serve their or gan iza tional unity and raise funds from 
rich Islamist bene fac tors from around the Is lamic world.
Many schol ars con sider Is lam as a com pre hen sive sys tem gov ern ing all as-
pects of hu man life. Is lam cov ers all ma te rial and spiri tual as pects, so ci ety and in-
di vid ual, poli tics and per sonal as pects. For this rea son a re mark able re sur gence of 
Islam ism in the past two dec ades it is not sur pris ing and it is very likely that in the 
fu ture the Mus lim Broth er hood’s slo gan ”Is lam is the so lu tion” will gain more mo-
men tum all over the Mid dle East4. Ac cord ing to Abu al-Fu tuh and other re form ist 
Mus lim Broth ers the Ca liph ate is a purely po liti cal, non re li gious mat ter, and our 
times call for other types of po liti cal unity, and the Euro pean Un ion is con sid ered 
1 Saad El Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 7.
2 Ibidem, pp. 7-8. 
3 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood”, 
cit., p. 9.
4 Sana ABED-KOTOB, ”The Accommodationists Speak...cit.”, p. 323. 
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an ex cel lent ex am ple. Al though this view ob vi ously con tra dicts the con ven tional 
un der stand ing of the Mus lim Broth er hood as a Sunni source of re li gious au thor ity 
(marja’iyyah), which would re store the abol ished Ca liph ate, the more re form ist 
idea gains more and more sup port ers among the mem bers of the Broth er hood1.
The Mus lim Broth ers have a dis tinct na tional fo cus and talk in their 2005 elec-
toral pro gram about terms such as the na tion’s iden tity, de vel op ment and re vival. 
The fo cus is on Egypt more than it is on the Mus lim com mu nity of be liev ers, the 
Um mah. Ac cord ing to them, the na tion’s iden tity should be re flected by its cul ture 
and the de vel op ment of ”the hu man be ing” in a way in which the mem bers of the 
na tion are strong and will ing to fur ther de velop for the bene fit of the coun try2. 
More over, the flaws of the na tion strength en ing proc ess come from low mor als, 
”the weak ness of the cul ture of be long ing and bad man ners” and there fore re viv-
ing the moral val ues is es sen tial3. This view comes from the teach ings of Prophet 
Mu ham mad who said, ”I was sent but to com plete the no ble man ners…And ver-
ily, you (O Mu ham mad) are on an ex alted stan dard of char ac ter. (Al-Qalam: 4)”4
The Broth er hood’s strive for the Um mah is not only a re sult of its his toric ideo-
logi cal de vel op ment but also a ne ces sity in the even tual es tab lish ment of an Is lamic 
state. The im ple men ta tion of the sharia is cru cial in the strife for the Um mah. Also, 
the only way to gain le giti macy for an Is lamic state is to fight for the Um mah.
The Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood was truly able to abide by the Quran and 
preach the uni fi ca tion of the Um mah view ing Egypt as the core cata lyst in this proc-
ess. This way the Mus lim Broth ers fight for the in de pend ence of Egypt in or der to 
be able this way to unite the Um mah around the Egyp tian core. Fur ther more, the 
strife for the Um mah can also be ob served in the moves to Arabize the coun try even 
more. The Ar abs are the peo ple of the Quran, and Al lah re vealed the holy book in 
Ara bic to them. For this rea son strength en ing the Arab ele ment in Egypt and else-
where in the Arab World is a step for ward to wards the unity of the Um mah.
The Mus lim Broth er hood 
on the In ter na tional Stage
The Mus lim Broth er hood’s stance in the in ter na tional arena has a few guid-
ing lines that stem from the Quran, ele ments of Egyp tian na tion al ism and secu lar 
po liti cal prag ma tism. When ana lyz ing the for eign pol icy stance of the Breth ren we 
can ob serve a few key ele ments that are es sen tial to their world view. First, we 
have the strife to unite the Um mah by in te grat ing the Arab and Is lamic coun tries 
around the Egyp tian core. The sec ond ob jec tive is the lib era tion of Pal es tine, an 
ob jec tive that is seen more as a re li gious duty rather than a stra te gic goal. An other 
ob jec tive of the Broth er hood is fur ther ing Is lamic causes around the world and 
pro tect ing Mus lims against for eign in vad ers.
1 Israel Elad ALTMAN, ”Current Trends in the Ideology of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood”, cit., p. 3.
2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., pp. 8-9. 
3 Ibidem, p. 9.
4 Ibidem. 
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In the Broth er hood’s view, Egypt needs to be a pow er ful coun try in or der to be 
able to gather the Um mah. The strate gies to achieve this aim call for the es tab lish-
ment of an in te grated in fra struc ture in or der to de velop an in dus trial and tech ni cal 
base. The main strate gies of the Mus lim Broth ers pro pose not only in te grated na-
tional pro jects such as de vel op ing Si nai, Al-Wadi Al-Gadid, the Red Sea, the North-
west Coast, the West De sert, but also spe cial ized na tional pro grams such as nu clear 
pro gram, space and avia tion pro gram, ar ma ment pro grams, vi tal tech niques pro-
grams. These strate gies are es sen tial to achieve a com pre hen sive de vel op ment in 
Egypt. What dif fer en ti ates the Broth er hood from the other Egyp tian po liti cal par ties 
is the dis tinct fo cus on the Is lamic world. Even in its elec toral pro gram the Broth er-
hood calls for a de vel op men tal in te gra tion with the Is lamic and Arab coun tries.
The nov elty that dis tin guishes the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood from its sis-
ter or gani za tions across the Arab world is the dis tinct fo cus on the in te gra tion of 
Egypt with its west ern and south ern neighbours, Libya and Su dan. This strat egy is 
con sid ered a fo cal point in the de vel op men tal proc ess of Egypt1. The move to wards 
re gional in te gra tion is not sur pris ing tak ing into con sid era tion the fact that dur ing 
the Brit ish Em pire Su dan was un der Egyp tian con trol while dur ing Nas ser’s time 
there were some moves to wards an Egyp tian and Lib yan in te gra tion. The fo cus on 
the re gional in te gra tion puts the poli cies of the Mus lim Broth ers in per spec tive and 
shows that ac tual na tional Egyp tian in ter ests pre vail in the geo strate gi cal arena.
In spite of this re gional in te gra tion ap proach, the path to wards in te gra tion with 
the other Is lamic and Ara bic coun tries is still the back bone of the Broth er hood’s strat-
egy. An ex am ple of this strat egy is found in the 2005 Elec toral Pro gram in the sec tion 
dedi cated to the sup port of ag ri cul tural de vel op ment. This sec tion rec og nizes the 
ab so lute need for in te gra tion with some Arab and Is lamic coun tries in or der to ” in-
crease the reve nue of the in vest ment in the ag ri cul tural pro duc tion”2.
In the na tional se cu rity sec tion of their 2005 elec toral pro gram the Mus lim 
Broth er hood stresses the fact that eco nomic sta bil ity and tra di tional cul tural val-
ues are a shield against ”for eign in va sion, west erni za tion, threats, and ag gres-
sion”3. More over the Broth er hood rec og nizes the high im por tance of the army for 
the so ci ety and for na tional se cu rity. In terms of for eign re la tions, re gional Is lamic 
re la tions are seen as the key in Egypt’s geo-stra te gic scheme. In or der to main tain 
Egypt’s sta bil ity the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood ad vo cates for broad en ing re la-
tions with Libya and Su dan, not only be cause they are in the geo graphi cal prox-
imity but also for the his tori cal links that al ways ex isted. In terms of stra te gic 
in ter ests the Broth er hood calls fur ther at ten tion the se cu rity of Si nai and the 
Arab-Is raeli con flict4. The Mus lim Broth ers do not men tion in their of fi cial docu-
ments the state of Is rael in stead they name it the Zi on ist re gime. This prac tice is 
very com mon among or gani za tions rooted in po liti cal Is lam.
The Mus lim Broth ers see Af rica as a play ground of stra te gic im por tance for 
Egyp tian in ter ests es pe cially when it comes to de fend ing Egypt’s in ter ests in the 
Nile Ba sin. For this rea son the Broth ers ad vo cate ”car ing for the coun tries of the 
River Nile’s ba sin and ac ti vat ing trade agree ments among them for sav ing the 
1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 12. 
2 Ibidem, p. 15. 
3 Ibidem, p. 32.
4 Ibidem.
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Egyp tian in ter ests”1. While Brit ish co lo nial era trea ties grant Egypt an ex ces sively 
large al lo ca tion of the Nile run off, there are other Af ri can na tions that need that 
wa ter. For the mo ment, the agree ments on wa ter al lo ca tion have been up held be-
cause of Egypt’s mili tary and stra te gic po si tion. Egypt’s de pend ence on Nile wa-
ters pre sents a dra matic ex am ple of re source eco nomic and po liti cal vul ner abil ity. 
About ninety-five per cent of Egypt’s wa ter comes from out side of the coun try, 
flow ing into it through the Su dan2.
Since the 1980’s, the Su dan has been ruled by an Is lamic mili tary dic ta tor-
ship. This situa tion cooled down the close links be tween Cairo and Khar toum. 
For this rea son Egypt can not rely that much on Su dan to help main tain the sta-
tus-quo for its guar an teed vol ume of wa ter sup ply3. From this per spec tive it is 
un der stand able that the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood sup ports ”in te gra tion 
pro jects be tween Egypt and Su dan, and draw ing up a time ta ble for ac com plish-
ment”4. More over, the his tori cal links and the ideo logi cal simi lari ties be tween the 
Islamists in Khar toum and the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood make this in te gra-
tion pro ject a de sir able goal. 
Other na tion al ist ac tions taken by Mus lim Broth er hood mem bers in the Peo-
ple's As sem bly are their fight against the for eign ers’ pos ses sion of the Egyp tian 
lands. They con sider this prac tice as dan ger on the Egyp tian na tional se cu rity. Fur-
ther more, they be lieve that the gov er norates where there was no in dus trial de vel-
op ment, es pe cially the Red Sea area, should be taken into spe cial con sid era tion5.
A com mon fea ture of Is lamic groups around the Arab World and the Mus lim 
Broth er hood is the pan-Is lamic na ture of their eco nomic think ing. Fur ther more, 
mili tants in par ticu lar dis agree with the ex ces sive dif fer en tial in the wealth of vari-
ous Is lamic coun tries and thus they be lieve that no true Mus lim ruler should tol er-
ate some Mus lims to en joy ex ces sive wealth (as in Saudi Ara bia) while other 
fel low Mus lims are starv ing (as is the case in Bang la desh)6.
In terms of eco nomic in te gra tion the Mus lim Broth er hood rec og nizes the cen-
tral ity of the Arab League in this proc ess and sup ports an ex ten sive role of the or-
gani za tion in the po liti cal, so cial, cul tural, eco nomic and stra te gic fields, es pe cially 
in the move to wards es tab lish ing a joint Arab mar ket7. The same in te gra tion move 
is ad vo cated when it comes to eco nomic re form. In te gra tion with the Arab, Is-
lamic and Af ri can coun tries is a stra te gic eco nomic pri or ity for the Broth er hood. 
Fur ther more, the eco nomic Arab unity could only be achieved by the es tab lish-
ment of joint pro jects be tween dif fer ent Arab capi tals8.
1 Ibidem, p. 33.
2 Peter H. GLEICK, ”Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security”, 
International Security, vol. 18, no. 1, Summer 1993, p. 86.
3 Ashok SWAIN, ”Ethiopia, the Sudan, and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute”, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, December 1997, p. 684. 
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 33. 
5 Abdul Moez MOHAMMED, ”News of Muslim Brotherhood Bloc”, Non-periodical bulletin 
on News of MB parliamentary bloc members in newspapers and internet, Fourth issue – April 2006, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/images/News%20of%20MB%20parliamentary%20bloc(4).doc. Accessed on 
10/02/2007.
6 Saad El-Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 9.
7 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 33. 
8 Ibidem, p. 37. 
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In many con flicts around the world the Mus lim Broth er hood has a for eign 
pol icy that pri ori tizes the Um mah. Ever since the Bos nian con flict in the be gin-
ning of the 1990s the Broth er hood be came very much in volved in help ing its fel-
low Mus lims. The Is lamic en thu si asm of that dec ade be came less dur ing pre sent 
day be cause of the vio lent ac tion that took place by some fight ers in Af ghani-
stan. For this rea sons, nowa days in the Ara bic and Mus lim gov ern ments put ob-
sta cles to this kind of trend. The sim plest strat egy is gov ern ment con trol over 
this trend by cur tail ing the rais ing of do na tions for Is lamic causes all over the 
world1. In the case con cern ing the Kash mir prob lem, the Broth er hood sup ports 
the UN reso lu tions de mand ing a ref er en dum, and de plores In dia’s re fusal to 
hold the ref er en dum2.
In the case of the first Gulf War the cen tral ity of the Um mah was also a key fac-
tor in de ter min ing the Broth er hood’s stance. Al though the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth-
er hood was among the first to con demn Iraq’s in va sion on Ku wait, it be came 
op posed to a re talia tory act against Iraq since it viewed this ac tion as an in ter nal 
feud among Arab lead ers. In the Broth er hood’s view these feuds were the fore-
most threat to the in teg rity and unity of the Um mah. For this rea son, al though the 
Breth ren started by con demn ing Sad dam’s in va sion of Ku wait, they ended up sup-
port ing the Iraqi re gime3.
Ac cord ing to its 2005 elec tions pro gram, the Mus lim Broth er hood has a 
truly pan-Ara bic agenda ad vo cat ing na tional re sis tance not only in Pal es tine, 
but also in Is raeli-oc cu pied Go lan Heights, a ter ri tory claimed by Syria. More-
over, the or gani za tion calls for re sis tance in Iraq, a coun try that was dur ing 2005 
still un der the oc cu pa tion of an Ameri can-led coa li tion that top pled Sad dam 
Hus sein in 2003. It is men tioned spe cifi cally that these ter ri to ries are Ara bic and 
the na tional re sis tance can be achieved by ”all pos si ble means”4 sug gest ing that 
armed re sis tance could be a way. This armed re sis tance is not un com mon in Is-
lam and is one of the five mean ings of the word Ji had, spe cifi cally Ji had by the 
sword (ji had bis saif). This form of ji had repre sents armed fight ing for God, a holy 
war for the de fence of Mus lim lands. Off shoots of the Mus lim Broth er hood, such 
as the Sala fis, adopted pre vi ously this kind of ap proach. Leiken and Brooke ar-
gue that the Broth er hood does au thor ize ji had in oc cu pied ter ri to ries such as Af-
ghani stan un der the So vi ets, Iraq and Pal es tine. They view this ji had as ”de fen sive 
ji had” against for eign in vad ers5.
Al Hu daibi sees the Mus lim Broth er hood as a popu lar move ment chained 
all over the Arab world. As any Is lamic popu lar move ments in Arab coun tries 
the Mus lim Broth er hood is banned since it is seen as an tago nis tic to the state. 
More over, Al-Hu daini sees that the Arab pub lic has been in the last years less 
re spon sive to the prob lems of their fel low Ar abs in coun tries such as Leba non, 
Af ghani stan or Su dan. When the United States bombed Su dan and Af ghani stan 
few dem on stra tions took place in Arab and Is lamic coun tries with the ex cep tion 
1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 24.
2 Ibidem, p. 24. 
3 Gehad AUDA, ”An Uncertain Response: The Islamic Movement in Egypt”, in James 
PISCATORI (ed.), Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, The American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, Chicago, 1991, p. 119.
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 32. 
5 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 116.
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of Su dan, where dem on stra tions were ar ranged by the gov ern ment it self1. When 
the mas sa cre of Qana took place, dur ing the 2006 Is raeli at tack on Leba non, 
there were a few dem on stra tions only in Pal es tine but no re ac tion in Egypt, 
Syria or other Arab2.
Of fi cially as an Is lamic move ment, the Mus lim Broth er hood does not par tici-
pate in any kind of gov ern ment, ex cept the Is lamic ones which ap ply the rules of 
sharia. In other coun tries with Mus lim popu la tions the dif fer ent cir cum stances 
ac tu ally dic tate other ap proaches. In other coun tries such as in In dia, where the 
Mus lims com prise over 200 mil lion, they can not rule by them selves and there fore 
they have to par tici pate in the rul ing of the state to gether with the Hin dus in or-
der to pro tect their wel fare. The same case is in Leba non where half of the Leba-
nese are Mari nates and Or tho dox Chris tians, and thus Mus lims can not ask for an 
Is lamic state3. In this case they have to reach an agree ment and gov ern to gether 
with the Chris tians and Druze. In the case of Egypt where only 10% of the popu-
la tion are Chris tians, the Mus lim Broth er hood does not see this mi nor ity as an 
im pedi ment in es tab lish ing an Is lamic state.
The pan-Is lamic idea of unity is also re flected in the fact that the Egyp tian 
Mus lim Broth er hood ac tu ally con sid ers Pal es tine as a com mon pro pri ety of all 
Mus lims be cause of the im por tance of Je ru sa lem. There fore Pal es tini ans do not 
have the right to give away any part of this holy land4. More over, they do not have 
this right be cause, ac cord ing to Is lam, on the Day of Judg ment, Mus lims will be 
judged if they de fended this holy city and for this rea son all have a re spon si bil ity 
in this mat ter5. Ac cord ing to the Mus lim Broth er hood Je ru sa lem is the main rea-
son for which Pal es tine is a Holy Land. This an cient city ac tu ally gives Pal es tine 
its unique ness and im por tance. More over:
”Pal es tine with out Je ru sa lem is noth ing but a pure po liti cal strug gle for 
lib erty Just as Si nai in Egypt, Go lan in Syria and the south ern bound ary strip 
of Leba non”6.
The rea son for which in Is lam Je ru sa lem is a sa cred place is the fact that here 
is the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the First of the Two Qib lahs and the third Holy Place af ter 
Mak kah and Madina. This holy mosque is im por tant be cause of its dis tance far 
from Mak kah and Madina. More over, the mosque and Je ru sa lem it self in di cate 
the weak state of the Mus lims in his tory and vice versa. For this rea son they 
rep re sent a real test of the force and strength of the Mus lims all over the world7. 
The Mus lim Broth ers con sider that the con tem po rary state of Je ru sa lem truly 
repre sents the weak nesses of the en tire Is lamic Na tion8. Also, Je ru sa lem is a sa-
cred city for Ar abs and Mus lims be cause is the city of the Al Aqsa mosque, the 
1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 3.
2 Ibidem, p. 10.
3 Ibidem, p. 14. 
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, 
The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/ images/
Jerusalem.doc, p. 1.  Accessed on 04/02/2007.
5 Ibidem, p. 2. 
6 Ibidem, p. 1.
7 Ibidem, p. 16. 
8 Ibidem, pp. 25-26.
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Holy place where Mu ham mad passed through dur ing his mid night jour ney to the 
seven heav ens and the city of the res ur rec tion of Je sus the Christ, the son of God 
for Chris tians and an im por tant prophet for Mus lims.
One of the first pan-Arabists was the Egyp tian scholar and poli ti cian, Ahmad 
Zaky Pa sha (1884-1934). He was among the first to call for Arab unity and that is 
why he was con sid ered ”The Sheikh of Ar ab ism”. In 1929, he left Egypt and went 
to Pal es tine to par tici pate in the fights of Ha’it al-Bu raq be tween the Ar abs of Pal-
es tine and the Jew ish Zi on ists. As a pan-Arabist, Ahmad Zaky Pa sha used to de-
plore the loss of Arab ter ri to ries to in fi dels and non-Ar abs. He was the one that 
called Anda lu sia ”The lost para dise” and even with his great in ter est in Pal es tine, 
he never thought that this land would be ”The sec ond lost para dise”1. How ever, 
the Breth ren strongly be lieve that in Pal es tine
”the con flict is con tinu ing and Ji had is pro ceed ing and Pal es tine is not a sec-
ond Anda lu sia and surely Al mighty Al lah shall grant Vic tory to His Be liev-
ers in the end. All Praises and Thank are due to Al lah, the Al mighty”2.
The Mus lim Broth er hood rec og nizes that the Jew ish colo nies and the Jew ish 
poli cies have been highly ef fec tive in Pal es tine and for this rea son the situa tion 
de te rio rated gravely. In this situa tion it is clear that the Mus lims might loose Je ru-
sa lem for ever3. The stra te gic im por tance of the city is cru cial since:
”Je ru sa lem is the pivot point; the point at which Arab iden tity and Is-
lam meet with out any op po si tion or con tra dic tion and Mus lims meet and 
par tici pate with Chris tians with out con flicts. In a word, Je ru sa lem gath ers all 
peo ple re gard less of their ap proach to life, whether secu lar or re li gious”4.
The lib era tion move ment of Pal es tine is char ac ter ized by an Is lamic ap proach 
and iden tity al though Is lam was in the be gin ning not that im por tant and be came es-
sen tial only later on5. In the con flict be tween the Is lamic re sis tance move ment Hamas 
and the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity ruled by Fat tah, the Broth er hood’s stance is clear. The 
Breth ren do not nec es sar ily sup port reach ing a so lu tion to the prob lem through ne go-
tia tions and they strongly sus tain Hamas. More over, when deal ing with the con flict 
be tween Is raelis and Pal es tini ans there is a gen eral con sen sus among Mus lim Broth-
er hood lead ers around the Arab world since they ex press will ing ness to fol low suit 
if Hamas, the Pal es tin ian off shoot of the Broth er hood, rec og nize the Is rael6.
Ac cord ing to the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood, the new Is lamic move ment 
of Pal es tine is the true rep re sen ta tive of the Pal es tin ian peo ple. This move ment 
rep re sented a true chal lenge to the his tori cal con trol of the Pal es tin ian Lib era tion 
Or gani za tion (PLO) over the lib era tion move ment7.
They call for Fat tah and Yasir Arafat to stop be ing a ”de struc tive ele ment” and 
work to gether with Hamas. Fur ther more, the Broth er hood views Hamas mar tyr dom 
1 Ibidem, p. 3. 
2 Ibidem, pp. 15-16. 
3 Ibidem, pp. 3-4. 
4 Ibidem, p. 4. 
5 Ibidem, pp. 8-9.
6 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 116. 
7 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, cit., p. 9.
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op era tions as to tally dif fer ent from those tak ing place in Egypt where some ci vil-
ians are hurt. They be lieve that the op era tions in Pal es tine are con sid ered mar tyr-
dom op era tions since they have the bak ing of Is lamic schol ars in clud ing the 
pre sent Sheikh of Al-Az har1.
Also, re gard ing the re la tions with the Pal es tin ian-Is raeli con flict, the Mus lim 
Broth er hood calls for a can cel la tion of ”the laws and reso lu tions which pre vent 
the fi nan cial aid to the oc cu pied peo ple (es pe cially the mili tary gov er nor’s reso lu-
tion num ber 4)”2. Mili tary De cree no.4 of 1992 for bids col lect ing or re ceiv ing do na-
tions for any rea son with out au thori za tion from the Min is try of So cial Af fairs and 
stipu lates a mini mum of 7 years im pris on ment to pun ish ment for in fringe ment of 
this de cree3. Al though this de cree is used usu ally when prose cut ing op po si tion 
civil so ci ety lead ers and or gani za tions on the home front, in Egypt, in the case of 
the Pal es tini ans there were US and Is raeli pres sures to cut fi nan cial aid to them. 
The pres sures were height ened af ter the Sec ond In ti fada of 2000 when arms and 
funds were chan nelled to Gaza through tun nels com ing from North Si nai.
Be cause, all Arab gov ern ments, with out ex cep tion, con sider Pal es tine as be-
long ing to all Mus lims and Ar abs, it is the re spon si bil ity of all the Arab gov ern-
ments to pro tect this ter ri tory4. The Mus lim Broth er hood con sid ers that main tain ing 
Pal es tine as an Arab and Is lamic ter ri tory is a mat ter of na tional se cu rity for all 
neighbour ing and dis tant Arab coun tries. In this stra te gic game the United States 
has high in ter ests. Al though neighbour ing coun tries such as Egypt, Jor dan, Syria 
and Leba non are cer tainly ca pa ble of sup port ing the Pal es tin ian move ment against 
Is raeli oc cu pa tion, they are wak ened by the United States. The US is us ing other 
Arab coun tries such as Iraq, Su dan and Libya to dis tract the at ten tion from Pal es-
tine and thus the Mus lim Broth er hood con sid ers that Pal es tine’s neighbour ing 
coun tries are los ing their po liti cal and stra te gic im por tance in case of con flict5.
Con cern ing the call for an eco nomic boy cott of Is rael and the United States, 
many Broth er hood lead ers hope for the boy cott to take place. More over they call 
for move to ”be backed by a strong au thor ity and it needs enor mous pub lic ity”6. 
Broth er hood lead ers do not con sider this eco nomic boy cott as fruit less since the 
fight against ”Zi on ism” should be taken on the eco nomic field and there fore re sist-
ing the for eign goods of the coun tries sup port ing the Zi on ists would be a vic tory 
to wards the lib era tion of Pal es tine7.
In terms of for eign pol icy the Mus lim Broth er hood has well de fined views that 
re flect the in ter ests of an ac tive Is lamic po liti cal move ment. The Mus lim Broth ers 
also fo cus a great deal on the re la tion ships be tween Arab coun tries, es pe cially 
Egypt, and Is rael. They sup port the move ments of boy cott and call for re sis tance 
against all kinds of nor mali za tion of re la tions with Is rael. More over they ap peal to 
all Arab coun tries to adopt a sin gle pol icy for deal ing with ”the Zi on ist pol icy” and 
1 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 23. 
2 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 33.
3 The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, ”2002 Report”, http://www.eohr.org/ 
report/2002/omtc1.htm. Accessed on 04/02/2007.
4 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, cit., 
p. 12.
5 Ibidem, pp.14-15. 
6 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 24.
7 Ibidem, p. 24.
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also re con sid era tion of the na ture of ”the Egyp tian-Zi on ist re la tions”1. This kind of 
dis course, al though popu lar with the masses, se ri ously goes against the rec on cilia-
tion pol icy pro moted by Egyp tian presi dent An war Sa dat and his suc ces sor, presi-
dent Hosni Muba rak. Fur ther more, Egypt’s role as a credi ble me dia tor in the 
Mid dle East and that of an US ally in the re gion might be threaten if this kind of 
pol icy would be adopted of fi cially by Cairo.
The Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood calls for a re con sid era tion of the Is-
raeli-Egyp tian re la tion ship. Now about twenty years af ter the late Egyp tian Presi-
dent An war Al-Sa dat went to Is rael in 1977 as a sign of con cilia tion, the situa tion 
in the Mid dle East is still vola tile. Even af ter Egypt be came the first coun try to sign 
a peace treaty with the Jew ish state in 19792, the re la tion ships be tween the en tire 
Arab World, Pal es tini ans in par ticu lar, and Is rael are still marked by vio lence. The 
re peated at tacks in Gaza and the Leba non war of 2006 are just a few ex am ples of 
the con tem po rary vio lence. In the light of these events, the Egyp tian Mus lim 
Broth er hood sees Egypt as a key player in the re gional geo-stra te gic game. The 
friendly Egyp tian-Is raeli re la tions are seen as dam ag ing for the Arab world, for 
the Pal es tin ian cause and for the Um mah in gen eral. By break ing the Is raeli-Egyp-
tian part ner ship for peace, the Mus lim Broth er hood hopes to turn the most popu-
lous and pow er ful Arab coun try against the Jew ish state thus cre at ing an 
im bal ance in the re gional power sys tem.
The Mus lim Broth er hood rec og nizes that much of the prob lems in Pal es tine 
re sult from the sup port of the United States for Is rael against the whole Arab 
world. Be cause of this stance the US is viewed by the Broth er hood as a new co lo-
nial power. An ex am ple to prove this point is the US his tory it self. The Breth ren do 
not for get the United States waged vio lent wars against the Na tive Ameri cans un-
der the ex cuse of es tab lish ing peace and sta bil ity in North Amer ica3. Broth er hood 
lead ers con sider that there is an Ameri can and ”Zi on ist” role in fight ing the Broth-
er hood in par ticu lar and Is lam and Mus lims in gen eral4.
The sug ges tion put for ward by the Mus lim Broth ers that the ba sis of the fu-
ture Egyp tian, Ameri can and Is raeli re la tions5 should be re vised by an an nual 
con fer ence where po liti cal pow ers, par ties and re search cen ters would par tici pate 
is not new. Al though not new it is an un re al is tic ap proach to the amia ble dip lo-
matic re la tions that should ex ist in the Mid dle East.
Of fi cially, the Mus lim Broth ers deny the ac cu sa tion that their or gani za tion is 
anti-Se mitic and they ar gue that there is no con flict be tween the Mus lim Broth er hood 
and the Jews, but them and the Zi on ists (which the Broth er hood does not con sider 
Jews). Re gard less of these de ni als, Broth er hood writ ings6 have ex pressed de tes ta-
tion for both Jews and ”Zi on ists”7. Such ex am ples are al ways pre sent in the Arab 
and Egyp tian press.
1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 32.
2 IDEM, ”What Does JERUSALEM Represent for Muslim?”, cit., p. 12. 
3 Ibidem, p. 5.
4 Muhammad Ma’mun AL-HUDAIBI, ”A Quiet Discussion on Heated Issues”, cit., p. 24.
5 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”The Muslim Brotherhood’s Electoral Program of 2005”, 
cit., p. 32.
6 The October 1980 children’s supplement to the Brotherhood newspaper Al Dawa, was 
published to teach children on ”the enemies of your religion”: ”Such are the Jews, my brother, 
Muslim lion cub”.
7 Robert S. LEIKEN, Steven BROOKE, ”The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 116.
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For ex am ple, the Mem bers of the Mus lim Broth er hood con tinue their fight 
against Zi on ism and Is rael even from the benches of the Egyp tian Par lia ment. 
Their rep re sen ta tives in the for eign re la tions com mit tee lob bied ac tively to re ject a 
reso lu tion of the UN Gen eral As sem bly de mand ing to cele brate the Jew ish Holo-
caust, on Janu ary, 27th an nu ally. The de mand was sent by the head of the Is raeli 
Knes set to Par lia ment speaker, Dr. Fathi So ror. The Mus lim Broth ers to gether with 
the other par lia men tary groups stated that:
”Egypt is not con cerned with the oc ca sion and the in ter na tional so ci ety 
should cele brate as well with the Zi on ist mas sa cres against the Arab na tions 
like Deir Yas sin, Sa bra and Shatila, Qana mas sa cre and Bahr Al Baqar School 
in ad di tion to many other oc ca sions. The mem bers added that the UN Gen-
eral As sem bly reso lu tion is is sued for gov ern ments and not Par lia ments and 
those reso lu tions are not obliga tory for the na tions”1.
Fur ther more, the fight of the Mus lim Broth er hood against Is raeli in ter ests 
goes also on the home front. In 2006, Dr. Mo ham med Al Bel taji – sec re tary of the 
MB par lia men tary bloc in the Egyp tian Par lia ment – sub mit ted an ur gent state-
ment to the Prime Min is ter and Min is ter of Plan ning and Re gional De vel op ment 
against the sell ing of a build ing of the Ameri can Uni ver sity in Cairo (AUC) to the 
Is raeli em bassy. This ini tia tive came af ter a num ber of news pa pers spoke about 
the AUC in ten tion to sell its lands down town Cairo to the Is raeli em bassy. The is-
sue was se ri ously ana lyzed and pub li cized by the Broth er hood and the leg is la tive 
was asked to take pre ven tive meas ures2.
Mus lim Broth er hood’s strife for the Um mah on the in ter na tional stage can be 
seen from dif fer ent per spec tives. The ven ues to achieve this goal are di verse: po liti-
cal and eco nomic in te gra tion, em pow er ing Egypt to be come the core of the Um-
mah, sup port ing Is lamic causes and Mus lims all over the world and the lib era tion 
of Pal es tine. The suc cess of these ven ues de pends not only of the Mus lims in gen-
eral but on the po liti cal power the Mus lim Broth er hood and its branches around 
the Mus lim World man age to ac quire.
Con clu sion
The emer gence of Is lamic mili tant move ments in Egypt in the past two dec-
ades is es pe cially im por tant for the gen eral po liti cal con text of the Mid dle East 
since Egypt has been con sid ered for cen tu ries the cen ter of the Arab-Mus lim 
world. It is the most popu lous and pow er ful Ara bic coun try, and its stra te gic lo ca-
tion make it a gate not only to wards the Mid dle East but also to North and Sub-Sa-
ha ran Af rica and the Medi ter ra nean. His tori cally, in the past two cen tu ries, what 
hap pened in Egypt in flu enced po liti cal and ideo logi cal cur rents in the Arab 
World and be yond. Be cause Egypt is con sid ered a true cul tural uni fier of the 
1 THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, ”News of Muslim Brotherhood parliamentary bloc 
(1)-Non periodical bulletin issued by MB Parliamentary bloc in Egyptian People’s Assembly-First 
Issue”, The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan) Official English Website, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/
images/kotla1_translation.doc. Accessed on 10/02/2007.
2 Abdul Moez MOHAMMED, ”News of Muslim Brotherhood Bloc”, cit.
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Arab-Mus lim world it has the po ten tial to in flu ence the vast area of the Arab and 
Is lamic world to re spond to it as one cen ter, par ticu larly in times of cri sis1.
Ac cord ing to Ibra him, the dream of es tab lish ing an Is lamic so cial or der has al-
ways been the ob jec tive of Mus lims for cen tu ries. His tory showed that ac tu ally it 
usu ally be comes an ar dent de mand dur ing na tional cri sis or in the af ter math of a 
hu milia tion at the hands of for eign ers. Ibra him be lieves that ”the Is lamic vi sion 
will never be cut down to its proper size un til it is tried at least once. This is why the 
Ira nian Revo lu tion is uniquely sig nifi cant for the pre sent and the near fu ture”2.
In the past two dec ades the Egyp tian Mus lim Broth er hood proved to be a 
strong po liti cal force not only in Egypt but across the Arab World. Its ide ol ogy 
spread across the Arab coun tries and in flu enced them in their own na tional po liti-
cal fab ric. The old Is lamic con cept of the Um mah, a con cept long for got ten by many 
Ar abs, was brought again to light from the an nals of the rise of Is lam and the Arab 
Em pire. Al though the prag matic in ter nal poli cies ad vo cated by the Mus lim Broth-
er hood might seem to fo cus on Egypt and its na tional in ter ests, the Broth er hood 
ac tu ally ad vo cates the re es tab lish ment of the all in clu sive Um mah where Egypt, as 
the most im por tant and popu lous Arab coun try, should play a piv otal role.
The for eign poli cies pro moted by the Mus lim Broth er hood and its branches 
across the Arab World stem from aims de rived from the Quran and the his tory of 
the Arab peo ple. Al though re al is tic, the Mus lim Broth ers po si tion them selves in 
in ter na tional mat ters fol low ing the Is lamic holy texts. Few po liti cal or gani za tions 
around the world could claim such re ligi os ity and vi sion in the for eign-pol icy mak-
ing proc ess. What dif fer en ti ates the Mus lim Broth er hood is the merg ing of guid ing 
lines from the Quran, ele ments of Egyp tian na tion al ism and secu lar po liti cal prag-
ma tism in or der to be come a ma jor player in Egyp tian and Mid dle East poli tics.
They are the first truly de moc ratic move ment that strives to unite the Um mah 
through the bal lot box. The me die val con cept of the Um mah be came a re al ity with the 
po ten tial of in te grat ing the Arab and Is lamic coun tries around the Egyp tian core, 
only be cause of the Mus lim Broth er hood. Also in this new re al ity pan-Arab is sues 
such as Pal es tine are seen from a dif fer ent per spec tive thus fur ther unit ing the Ar abs 
to wards the Um mah as a way of pro tect ing Mus lims against for eign in vad ers.
The prac ti cal re al ity has proved the in ca pac ity of many Islamist groups to 
solve so ci ety’s prob lems ef fi ciently. For ex am ple ”Is lam is the key so lu tion” was 
also the Tali ban’s slo gan in Af ghani stan. Their true loy alty to fun da men tal Is lam 
was well-known, how ever, they took dev as tat ing po liti cal de ci sions that pushed 
Af ghani stan back wards. In the same fash ion the Su da nese Islamists (the friends of 
the Mus lim Broth er hood) ruled in a revo lu tion ary man ner, and main tained the 
civil war in Su dan thus im ped ing the pro gress of de moc racy in the coun try3.
Al though the Egyp tian Breth ren did not have yet the chance to come to pow-
er and solve so ci ety’s prob lems, they gained a truly in flu en tial role in the Is lamic 
so ci ety all over the world. They truly be came a model for po liti cal achieve ments 
through their mod er ate stand point. This mod er ate stand point is criti cal for the 
Broth er hood’s role in the Mid dle East since it is giv ing a real hope to those Mus-
lims look ing to wards uni fy ing the Um mah.
1 Saad El Din IBRAHIM, ”Egypt Islam and Democracy...cit.”, p. 3.
2 Ibidem, pp. 22-23. 
3 Amr AL-CHOBAKI, ”The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood”, cit., p. 28.
